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AIDS CAPS, CONTRACEPTIVE COVERAGE, 
AND THE LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
FEDERAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STATUTES' 
APPLICABILITY TO HEALTH INSURANCE 
Sharona Hoffman* 
INTRODUCTION 
Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company offered its customers 
insurance policies that limited lifetime benefits for AIDS or AIDS-
related conditions ("ARC") to either $25,000 or $100,000, while 
other conditions were covered up to $1 million over a lifetime. 1 
When this discrepancy was challenged by two of its insured as 
violating the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")/ Mutual 
of Omaha conceded that AIDS was a disability under the ADA, a 
federal law that prohibits discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities.3 The defendant also acknowledged that the AIDS 
coverage caps were not justified as "consistent with sound 
actuarial principles, actual or reasonably anticipated experience, 
bona fide risk classification, or state law."4 Although the insurer 
offered no justification for its discriminatory reimbursement 
limitation, the Seventh Circuit in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Tuled 
that the AIDS cap was not unlawful and could continue to be 
utilized by the defendant.5 
The Doe decision is typical of opinions issued by many courts 
that have evaluated and upheld allegedly discriminatory health 
insurance policies challenged under the ADA. Health insurers 
typically deny coverage for speech therapy, eyeglasses, hearing 
*Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
LL.M. in Health Law, University of Houston; J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Wellesley 
College. I wish to thank Wilbur Leatherberry, Max Mehlinan, Andrew Morriss, and 
Spencer Neth for their valuable comments regarding earlier drafts of this Article and Lisa 
Durkee for her dedicated research assistance. 
1 See Doe v. Mutual of Omaha, 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999). 
2 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994). 
3 See Doe, 179 F.3d at 558-59. 
4 Id. 
5 See id. at 557. 
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aids, most foot care, and treatment for infertility.6 Many insurance 
providers exclude or severely limit coverage for treatment of 
mental impairment, dental problems,7 AIDS, diabetes mellitus, 
severe obesity, epilepsy, and alcoholism or drug abuse.8 Insurance 
restrictions have generated significant litigation, but have rarely 
been proscribed by the courts.9 While some Americans enjoy full 
coverage for all their health needs, others who have insurance and 
suffer from serious or even life-threatening conditions, such as 
AIDS, must incur the expense of costly treatment or forego it if it 
is unaffordable. 
Allegations of discriminatory insurance coverage are brought 
not only under the ADA, but also under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), which prohibits employment 
discrimination based on gender and other protected 
classifications.10 In September of 2000, for example, Jennifer 
Erickson filed a class action alleging that her employer's 
prescription drug plan unlawfully discriminated against female 
employees because it excluded coverage for prescription 
6 See BERTRAM HARNETT & IRVING I. LESNICK, THE LAW OF LIFE AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE § 6A.11[1] (2000). Not all of the conditions related to these treatments 
constitute disabilities. See infra Part I.B.l. 
7 See Samuel A. Marcosson, Who Is "Us" and Who Is "Them"-Common Threads 
and the Discriminatory Cut-off of Health Care Benefits for AIDS Under ERISA and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 361, 416 (1994). 
8 Donald W. Light, The Practice and Ethics of Risk-Rated Health Insurance, 267 J. 
AM. MED. Ass'N (JAMA) 2503, 2504 (1992). 
9 See, e.g., McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 20~ F.3d 179, 186-89 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that 
health insurance plans containing caps for AIDS treatment do not violate the ADA); Ford 
v. Schering-Plough Corp, 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999) 
(finding that a disparity in an employer's insurance benefits for treatment of mental and 
physical conditions does not violate the ADA); Bythway v. Principal Health Care of Del. 
Inc., No. Civ. 97-435-GMS, 1999 WL 33220042 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 1999) (holding that a 
health insurance provision that limited or denied coverage to Hodgkin's disease patients 
for bone marrow transplants, while allowing it for those suffering from aplastic ariemia or 
acute leukemia, is not unlawfully discriminatory under the ADA); but see Boots v. 
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 77 F.Supp.2d 211, 215-20 (D.N.H. 1999) (holding that a 
disability plan's limitations on coverage for mental disabilities are potentially 
discriminatory under the ADA). 
10 See 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). The provision reads: 
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin; 
Id. Unlilce the ADA, Title VII applies only to employment discrimination and not to 
discrimination in other contexts such as insurance. Compare id., and 42 U.S.C. §§12101-
12213. Thus, benefits that are provided by employers are regulated by the statute, but 
those purchased directly from an insurance provider are not governed by Title VII. See id. 
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contraceptives while covering other preventive prescriptions.n On 
June 12, 2001, a federal district court in the state of Washington 
granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, finding that the 
employer-provided benefit plan violated Title VII as amended by 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 ("PDA").12 The court 
reasoned that classifying employees based on their childbearing 
capacity, regardless of whether they are pregnant, constitutes sex-
based discriminationY Furthermore, when an employer's benefit 
plan excludes from coverage only a few specific drugs and devices, 
the employer must ensure that "it provides equally comprehensive 
coverage for both sexes."14 Nevertheless, while Jennifer Erickson 
prevailed in her Title VII claim of discriminatory health insurance 
benefits, many plaintiffs do not enjoy similar success.15 
This Article will analyze the ADA, Title VII, and other 
federal anti-discrimination laws and examine the extent to which 
they govern the terms of health insurance policies.16 It focuses on 
exclusions or limitations of coverage in health insurance policies, 
such as AIDS caps or refusal to reimburse for particular forms of 
treatment. The Article does not address instances in which a plan 
administrator denies coverage in an individual case because she 
determines that a particular procedure was not medically 
necessary or was experimental. 
This Article provides a detailed analysis of the language of the 
ADA, Title VII, and other statutes, as they apply to health 
insurance. It also critiques the courts' interpretations of the 
11 Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1268 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
12 !d. at 1276-77. The PDA provides in relevant part: 
The tenns "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not linited 
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical 
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, 
including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not 
so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work. ... 
42 U.S. C. § 2000e(k). 
13 See Erickson, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 1271. 
14 !d. at 1272. 
15 See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996) (excluding 
coverage for fertility treatments is not violative of Title VII); Sales v. Covey, 117 F. Supp. 
2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (failing to cover infertility treatments does not violate Title VII); 
Reger v. Espy, 836 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (denying coverage for high-dose 
c?emothenipy with autologous bone marrow transplant to treat breast cancer found not to 
VIolate Title VII) . 
. . 
16 !his Article focuses on health insurance because it has generated extensive 
~t1gatwn, administrative agency guidance, and academic debate. However, the statutory 
mterpretation and many of the concepts developed in this Article can be extended to 
apply to other fonns of insurance and employee benefits. Several of the judicial opinions 
?Iscussed in the following sections will in fact focus on benefits other than health 
msurance, such as disability and pension plans. 
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statutory language in the areas of disability and gender 
disc1imination. This Article argues that in the arena of health 
insurance, the statutory scheme that purports to protect 
individuals against disability, gender, and age discrimination is 
characterized by significant gaps and loopholes. Consequently, 
while the statutes prohibit some discriminatory insurance 
practices, their reach is confined, and their effectiveness is limited. 
Part I analyzes the ADA at length. The ADA is the first 
federal anti-discrimination statute to address health insurance in a 
separate provision, 17 and this provision has generated significant 
litigation and academic debate. Part II discusses several other 
federal statutes that regulate health insurance. The Article 
concludes with a discussion of various means by which the 
statutory gap could be remedied in order to enhance protection for 
health insurance beneficiaries. 
I. THE ADA AND HEALTH INSURANCE 
Analysis of the application of the ADA to health insurance 
involves attention to a complex series of questions. First, can the 
ADA be applied to health insurance practices in light of the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act,18 which establishes that a federal statute 
cannot interfere with a state's insurance laws unless the federal 
statute was specifically enacted to regulate the insurance business? 
Second, what types of insurance limitations and exclusions are to 
be deemed disability-based distinctions, governed by the ADA? 
Third, two separate sections of the ADA are at issue: Title I, 
which governs employer conduct, 19 and Title III, which governs the 
conduct of those who own, lease, or operate "a place of public 
accommodation. "20 Who is covered by each of the two Titles? 
Does Title III apply to the terms of insurance plans? 
Fourth, what is the meaning of the ADA's "safe-harbor 
17 See Americans with Disabilities Act§ 501(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994). 
18 15 u.s.c. § 1012(b) (1994). 
t9 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
20 !d. § 12182(a). Title II of the ADA provides that "no qualified individual with a 
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied 
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity." !d. § 12132. Since health insurance companies are not 
public entities, Title II does not regulate their operations. Furthermore, a public entity 
that offers employees health insurance as a benefit, can be sued under Title I, which 
governs employment discrimination. See id. § 12112(a). Title II is therefore inapplicable 
to health insurance controversies. See Weyer v. Twentieth Cent. Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 
1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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provision," section SOl( c) of the statute,Z1 which creates a defense 
for insurance providers? Which if any benefit exclusions or 
limitations are prohibited by the statute? To what extent should 
insurers have to justify their risk classification practices22 when 
challenged under the ADA? Each of these questions will be 
discussed below. 
A. The McCarran-Ferguson Act 
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that "[n]o Act of 
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any 
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the 
business of insurance ... unless such Act specifically relates to the 
business of insurance."23 The McCarran-Ferguson Act is 
understood to protect not only the validity of state laws, but also 
states' administrative regimes, and thus it may limit the 
applicability of a federal law even when a state legislature has not 
specifically enacted a relevant insurance statute.24 Most states 
have insurance boards, commissioners, or other officials that are 
statutorily empowered to regulate the insurance business within 
the state in order to safeguard the public interest, establish 
uniform rates, and enforce insurance laws.25 States generally, 
therefore, have an extensive system of insurance regulation. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act narrowly. In Humana v. Forsyth,Z6 the 
Court explained that "[w]hen federal law does not directly conflict 
with state regulation, and when application of the federal law 
would not frustrate any declared state policy or interfere with a 
State's administrative regime, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does 
not preclude its application. "27 The Act was designed to protect 
state regulation from inadvertent federal interference such as 
might occur if a federal law targets a general activity of which 
insurance happens to be one component.28 Furthermore, the 
21 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c). 
22 The practice of classifying risks is the "[c]ategorization on the basis of established 
criteria for rating risks, establishing premiums and tabulating statistical experience." 
RICHARD V. RUPP, RUPP'S INSURANCE & RISK MANAGEMENT GLOSSARY 76 (1991). 
23 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). 
24 See Hurnana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 310 (1999). 
25 See LEER. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D§ 2:7 (1997). 
26 525 u.s. 299 (1999). 
27 I d. at 310. 
28 See Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 39 (1996). 
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Supreme Court has instructed that the phrase "relates to the 
business of insurance" is to be interpreted broadly in the 
preemption context. 29 The federal statute at issue need not be 
predominantly about insurance, but rather, need only make 
"specific detailed references to the insurance industry."3° For 
example, the case of Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson/1 
involved a federal statute that established that certain national 
banks could sell insurance in small towns, while a Florida law 
precluded such sales.32 The Court found that the federal statute 
specifically related to insurance and therefore preempted the state 
law pursuant to the McCarren Ferguson Act_33 
The question of whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act 
precludes application of the ADA to ~surance practices has 
generated a split in the circuits. The Third and Seventh Circuits 
have ruled that the McCarran-Ferguson Act bars plaintiffs' claims 
regarding allegedly discriminatory health insurance provisions,34 
while the Second Circuit has held that application of the ADA to 
insurance underwriting is not barred by the McCarran-Ferguson 
AcU5 The logic of the Second Circuit is far more persuasive than 
that of its counterparts and should be adopted by future courts 
deciding the issue. 
In Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp.,36 the Third Circuit 
concluded that the ADA does not "specifically relate[] to the 
business of insurance" because the term "insurance" does not 
appear in the statute's introductory section entitled "Findings and 
Purposes. "37 The court did not elaborate upon its reasoning and 
provided no further discussion of the question. In Doe v. Mutual 
of Omaha Ins. Co. ,38 the Seventh Circuit ruled that the ADA can 
be construed as preventing insurance companies from refusing to 
insure disabled individuals.39 However, according to the court, the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act precludes an interpretation of the ADA 
that would broaden its scope to govern rate and coverage issues.40 
29 I d. at 38. 
30 Id. at41. 
31 517 u.s. 25 (1996). 
32 See id. at 28-29. 
33 See id. at 41. 
34 See Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 563-65 (7th Cir. 1999); Ford v. 
Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 611-12 (3d Cir. 1998). 
35 See Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 33-35 (2d Cir. 1999). 
36 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998). 
37 I d. at 611-12. 
38 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999). 
39 See id. at 564. 
40 See id. 
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The court explained that states regulate insurance 
comprehensively and therefore should not be subject to federal 
intervention. 
By contrast, in Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co. ,41 the Second 
Circuit held that the ADA "specifically relate[ s] to the business of 
insurance," and therefore the states are not protected from its 
intrusion into the realm of insurance underwriting.42 Providing an 
extensive explanation of its decision, the court noted that Title III 
of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination with respect to the 
goods and services of a place of public accommodation,43 
specifically defines "public accommodation" as including 
insurance offices.44 Moreover, section 501( c), which applies to 
both Title I and Title III of the ADA, is devoted entirely to 
insurance and discusses the applicability of the statute to insurance 
practices.45 In fact, the Pallozzi court hypothesizes that Section 
501(c) was written specifically to address the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act and to remove any doubt regarding the applicability of the 
ADA to insurance industry practices, even though these practices 
are regulated by the states.46 
The plain language of section 501(c) provides compelling 
evidence that the ADA extends to risk classification practices.47 
The text allows insurers to underwrite risks, classify risks, or 
administer risks so long as the insurers' decisions are not 
inconsistent with state law and are not used as a subterfuge to 
evade the purpose of the ADA.48 The statute thus appears to 
instruct courts to scrutinize risk classification practices to ensure 
that they are consistent with state law and do not constitute a 
"subterfuge." Moreover, if an insurance provider limits or 
excludes coverage in a manner that cannot be considered to be 
"underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering risks,"49 it 
will not be immune from liability for unlawful discrimination.50 
41 198 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1999). 
42 !d. at 33-34. 
43 See 42 U.S. C. § 12182(a) (1994). 
44 !d. § 12181(7)(F). 
45 !d. § 1220l(c). See infra Part J.D. for the text of the provision. 
46 Pallozi, 198 F.3d at 35. 
47 See id. at 34-35. 
48 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c). 
49 !d. 
50 It should also be noted that the ADA will rarely conflict directly with an insurance 
law enacted by a state. The states have not enacted laws that specifically allow coverage 
exclusions or limitations that might be challenged under the ADA Consequently, the 
states do not negate the ADA's anti-discrimination mandate by affirmatively allowing 
certain forms of discrimination. Rather, when state laws address particular medical 
conditions, they mandate coverage for those ailments and thus provide patients with 
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In light of the text of Title III, section 501(c), and relevant 
Supreme Court precedent, the conclusions of the Third and 
Seventh Circuits must be rejected. The reasoning of the Pallozzi 
court, on the other hand, is insightful and convincing. Because the 
ADA specifically relates to the business of insurance, it must be 
read to regulate insurance classification and underw1iting 
practices, even though insurance is extensively regulated by the 
states. 
B. Disability-Based Distinctions 
1. The Statutory Definition of "Disability" 
While the ADA applies to the business of insurance, its reach 
is limited. The ADA prohibits only discrimination that is based on 
disability and does not govern conduct that disadvantages 
individuals who have medical conditions that are not sufficiently 
severe to constitute disabilities. The statute defines the term 
"disability" as follows: 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
one or more of the major life activities of ... [an] individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.51 
An insurance provision that excludes or limits coverage for 
treatment of a medical condition that does not "substantially limit" 
a "major life activity"52 cannot be successfully challenged under 
the ADA. Examples would be speech therapy for a slight speech 
impediment or psychological therapy for a temporary feeling of 
sadness. 
The ADA's statement of "Findings and Purposes"53 begins by 
protection against discrimination. See HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 6, at § 13.06[4]. 
Thus, arguably, the McCarran-Ferguson Act will generally be inapplicable to ADA 
challenges because the ADA does not explicitly conflict with state laws. However, one 
might argue that if a state has been silent with respect to a particular insurance term, such 
as an AIDS coverage cap, it meant to allow its implementation. Therefore, arguably, the 
prohibition of the practice under the ADA interferes with the state's regulatory scheme, 
and the McCarran-Ferguson Act must be considered. 
51 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2). 
52 The term "major life activity" is not defined in the statute. However, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") regulations define it as "functions 
such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, 
breathing, learrting, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2)(i) (2000). 
53 42 u.s.c. § 12101. 
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asserting that forty-three million Americans have one or more 
disabilities and that the number is increasing as our population 
ages.54 The statute therefore contemplates that a significant 
percentage of Americans will be covered by the ADA. The 
courts, however, have not been generous to plaintiffs in their 
interpretation of the ADA's anti-discrimination mandate. 
2. The Supreme Court's Interpretation 
The Supreme Court has construed the scope of the term 
"disability" to be quite narrow. The Court has stated that the 
text's language requires that "a person be presently-not 
potentially or hypothetically-substantially limited in order to 
demonstrate a disability."55 Consequently, a degenerative 
condition such as multiple sclerosis is only a disability once it 
actually substantially limits a major life activity. The Court has 
also emphasized that in order to have a disability, "an individual 
must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the 
individual from doing activities that are of central importance to 
most people's daily lives."56 Furthermore, in Sutton v. United Air 
Lines,57 the Supreme Court ruled that an individual whose physical 
or mental impairment is corrected by medication or other 
treatments does not have a "disability" and is not entitled to ADA 
protection.58 A person with diabetes or epilepsy whose symptoms 
are effectively controlled by drug therapy, therefore, will not be 
considered disabled according to the Supreme Court. 
The problem of limited health insurance coverage raises an 
interesting question in light of the Sutton case. In some instances, 
an individual might have a condition, such as profound hearing 
loss, that is potentially correctable, but the patient cannot afford 
the corrective measure because her insurance policy does not 
provide reimbursement for it.59 The Supreme Court did not 
address the issue of whether a person who does not have access to 
54 !d. § 12101(a)(1). 
55 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). 
56 Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 122 S.Ct. 681, 693 (2002). 
57 527 u.s. 471 (1999). 
58 See id. at 482-83. The case involved severely myopic airplane pilots who were 
denied employment by United Airlines and subsequently challenged United's minimum 
vision requirement. The Court ruled that they were not "disabled" under the ADA 
because their vision was corrected with eyeglasses, and thus they were not entitled to 
statutory protections. See id. at 488. 
59 Hearing aids are often not covered by insurance policies. See HARNETT & 
LESNICK, supra note 6, § 6A.l1[1]. 
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corrective measures for financial reasons can be considered 
disabled even though effective treatment is available and could 
potentially mitigate the condition.6° Coverage exclusions for 
hearing aids, for example, pose a difficult problem under the 
Sutton precedent. Do they constitute a disability-based distinction 
because they prevent severely hearing-impaired individuals from 
obtaining needed corrective devices or are they not susceptible to 
challenge under the ADA because hearing impairment is a 
condition that can be mitigated by use of hearing aids and thus is 
not a disability?61 The courts will likely have to grapple with this 
question in the future. 
3. Disparate Impact Analysis 
The anti-discrimination laws generally proscribe practices that 
are facially neutral but have a disparate impact on members of a 
particular protected class or classes.62 Thus, Title I of the ADA 
provides that employers may not utilize "standards, criteria, or 
methods of administration . . . that have the effect of 
discrimination on the basis of disability. "63 Similarly, Title III 
prohibits individuals and entities from utilizing standards or 
mechanisms "that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of 
disability. "64 In the context of insurance coverage, however, 
disparate impact analysis cannot be utilized.65 
In Alexander v. Choate,66 the Supreme Court considered a 
challenge to the State of Tennessee's decision to reduce from 20 to 
14 the number of annual inpatient hospital days for which the 
state's Medicaid program would reimburse hospitals.67 The 
60 See Christine Tomko, Economically Disadvantaged and the ADA: Why Economic 
Need Should Factor into the Mitigating Measures Disability Analysis, 52 CASE W. REs. L. 
REv. (forthcoming 2002). 
61 See id. (arguing that individuals who cannot afford mitigating measures should be 
considered to be individuals with disabilities despite the availability of medication or 
devices that would alleviate their conditions). 
62 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432-36 (1971) (finding that facially 
neutral educational and testing requirements that were not reasonable measures of job 
performance and had a disparate impact on the hiring of African Americans violated Title 
VII). 
63 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A) (1994). 
64 !d. § 12182(b)(1)(D)(i). 
65 See Bonnie Tucker, Health Care and the Americans with Disabilities Act: Access to 
Health Care for Individuals with Hearing lmpainnents, 37 Hous. L. REv. 1101, 1150-51 
(2000). 
66 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
67 See id. at 289. The case was brought under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
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plaintiffs argued that this reduction was unlawful because it had a 
disproportionate effect on individuals with disabilities and because 
any limitation on the number of inpatient hospital days 
disproportionately disadvantages the disabled.68 The Supreme 
Court disagreed and ruled against the plaintiffs. It reasoned that 
the fourteen day limitation will provide both those with disabilities 
and those without them with identical hospital services.69 The 
Court stated that "the reduction, neutral on its face, does not 
distinguish between those whose coverage will be reduced and 
those whose coverage will not on the basis of any test, judgment, 
or trait that the handicapped as a class are less capable of meeting 
or less likely of having. "70 
The ADA's legislative history confirms that the Alexander v. 
Choate decision is applicable to the ADA. The House Labor 
Committee report explains: 
[A]s is stated by the U.S. Supreme Court, in Alexander v. 
Choate ... employee benefit plans should not be found to be in 
violation of this legislation under impact analysis simply 
because they do not address the special needs of every person 
with a disability, e.g., additional sick leave or medical 
coverage.71 
Likewise, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's 
("EEOC") guidelines provide that health-related distinctions are 
not disability-based if they are broad distinctions that apply to a 
variety of dissimilar conditions and affect both persons with 
disabilities and those without them.72 Accordingly, an exclusion or 
limitation that has an adverse impact on people with a particular 
disability but also affects people without a disability is not 
governed by the ADA. The guidelines, therefore, do not support 
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). The Rehabilitation Act prohibits disability discrimination by 
any program receiving Federal funds and thus applies to Medicaid. See id. Cases 
interpreting the Rehabilitation Act are applicable to the ADA, a much newer statute for 
which a more limited body of interpretive case law exists. The Rehabilitation Act itself 
states that "[t]he standards used to determine whether this section has been violated in a 
complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section shall be the standards 
applied under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990." ld. § 791(g) 
(citation omitted). 
68 Choate, 469 U.S. at 290. 
69 See id. at 302. 
70 See id. One scholar notes that Alexander v. Choate may be distinguished from cases 
brought under the ADA because unlike the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act does not 
contain an explicit provision prohibiting practices that have a disparate impact on people 
with disabilities. See Chai R. Feldblum, The Employment Sector, in IMPLEMENTING THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 142 n.102 (Jane West ed. 1996). 
71 HR. REP. No. 485 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 420. 
72 Section 3: Employee Benefits, EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) No. 265, 627:0001, at 
627:0022 (Oct. 3, 2000) [hereinafter Employee Benefits]. 
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the use of disparate impact analysis in the health rnsurance 
context. 
Public policy considerations also militate against utilization of 
the disparate impact theory to challenge health insurance plans 
under the ADA. If the theory were applicable, essentially all 
benefits, exclusions, or limitations would be vulnerable to 
challenge under the ADA since individuals with disabilities are 
likely to need more medical care than others and to be more 
disadvantaged by any reimbursement restrictions. For example, 
limitations on life-time benefits, on coverage for eye care or 
elective surgery, or on the number of blood transfusions or x-rays 
for which reimbursement can be obtained, may all have a greater 
impact on individuals with particular disabilities than on others.73 
If disparate impact analysis were applicable to the ADA, 
insurers who fear repeated court challenges might be reluctant to 
implement many of the benefit restrictions that have traditionally 
been used as cost-containment measures.74 Premiums would then 
rise, rendering health insurance unaffordable for an increasing 
number of individuals.75 In the alternative, requiring insurers to 
tailor their reimbursement restrictions so that they do not 
adversely impact individuals with disabilities to a greater extent 
than others would impose a very heavy burden on the industry. 
Insurers would have to determine on a case-by-case basis which 
disabilities were adversely affected by each benefit term, which 
claimants actually had those disabilities, and what amount of 
additional coverage would eliminate the disparate impact for those 
73 See id. at 627:0022-0023: see also EEOC Interim Guidance on Application of ADA to 
Health Insurance, EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) No. 265, N:2303-2304 (Oct. 3, 2000) 
[hereinafter EEOC Interim Guidance]. 
74 When challenged in court, insurers can always defend their benefits terms pursuant 
to Section 501(c). However, insurers might be concerned that they will be unable to 
provide sufficient proof of an actuarial or cost-based justification to overcome ADA 
challenges from sympathetic plaintiffs. See discussion infra Part I.D. 
75 Another concern is adverse selection. Adverse selection refers to a potential shift in 
the health insurance customer population. If insurers raise premium prices too high, those 
who perceive themselves as being low-risk will consider the product's price to be higher 
than its value and will therefore buy little if any health insurance coverage. Those who 
believe they are high-risk will purchase extensive coverage, unless premium prices rise to 
the point that it is cheaper for consumers to pay for the full cost of health care out of 
pocket. If all individuals who have insurance coverage incur high medical costs because of 
health problems, insurance prices will rise higher and higher, creating a "death spiral" of 
premiums and leading ever-decreasing numbers of healthy people to buy insurance. As 
prices continue to rise even high-risk individuals will become unable to afford insurance 
coverage. Ultimately, adverse selection could destabilize or even bankrupt the insurance 
industry. See John Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C DAVIS L. REv. 311, 387-
88 (1997). 
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entitled to ADA protection.76 Even if this were possible, it would 
significantly raise administrative costs that would then be passed 
on to consumers in the form of higher prices. 
4. AIDS Caps and Disparities in Coverage for Treatment 
of Mental and Physical Conditions 
The two insurance practices that have generated litigation 
most frequently are coverage caps for the treatment of AIDS77 and 
disparities in coverage for treatment of mental and physical 
ailments.78 As discussed below, while the first constitutes a 
disability-based distinction, the second does not. 
In Bragdon v. Abbott/9 the Supreme Court determined that a 
woman with asymptomatic human immunodeficiency virus 
("HIV") was an individual with a disability because the condition 
substantiallylimited her ability to reproduce, which is a major life 
activity.80 The Court declined to decide the question of whether 
HIV infection always constituted a per se disability, as defined by 
the ADA.81 Thus, it did not indicate whether an individual who 
does not wish to reproduce or is unable to do so for reasons other 
76 See H.R. REP. No. 485 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 420 (stating that 
employee benefits plans do not violate the ADA under disparate impact analysis when 
they do not satisfy the special needs of persons with disabilities by providing them with 
additional medical coverage). 
77 See, e.g., Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance, 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(challenging the cap of medical insurance benefits for the treatment of AIDS and AIDS-
related conditions); Gonzales v. Garner Food Services, Inc., 89 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(alleging that a health insurance plan's cap for AIDS-related treatment violated the 
ADA). 
78 See, e.g., Ford v. Schering-Plough Corporation, 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(challenging the disparity between disability insurance benefits for mental disabilities and 
disability insurance benefits for physical disabilities); Wilson v. Globe Specialty Products, 
117 F. Supp. 2d 92 (D. Mass. 2000) (challenging the termination of mental disability 
coverage under a disability benefit plan); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th 
Cir. 1997) (alleging that a long-term disability plan that provided longer benefits for 
employees who suffered from physical illness than for those. who suffered from mental 
illness violated the ADA); Whaley v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (D. Neb. 2000) 
(challenging the validity of a disability insurance policy that limited payments for 
disabilities relating to nervous or mental disorders); Bril v. Dean Witter, Discover & Co., 
986 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (alleging that a long-term disability plan unlawfully 
discriminated against the plaintiff by differentiating between psychiatric and physical 
illnesses). Many of the cases that analyze the ADA's applicability to insurance benefits 
involve disability insurance rather than health insurance. Disability insurance features the 
same kinds of limitations and exclusions that are found in health insurance and therefore 
analysis relating to one type of insurance can be extended to the other. 
79 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
80 See id. at 641. 
81 See id. at 642. 
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than IDV would be entitled to statutory protection. 
The Court noted that under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural 
Resource Defense Council,82 guidelines and opinions issued by 
administrative agencies regarding the definition of "disability" are 
entitled to deference.83 Both the Department of Justice ("DOJ") 
and the EEOC have issued statements finding that IDV infection 
is a disability.84 The Court also noted that once HIV has 
developed into AIDS, many very serious conditions such as 
pneumocystis carninii, pneumonia, Kaposi's sarcoma, and non-
Hodgkins lymphoma often appear.85 In addition, many 
uncomfortable conditions that affect HIV patients, such as fever, 
weight loss, fatigue, lesions, nausea, and diarrhea, worsen.86 A 
clear inference can be drawn from the Court's statements that 
even if HIV is not a disability in all cases, AIDS is. Consequently, 
a limitation of coverage for AIDS treatment that is lower than 
limitations for other treatments constitutes a disability-based 
distinction that is vulnerable to challenge under the ADA.87 
Unlil<:e AIDS caps, unequal coverage for physical and mental 
conditions is not a disability-based distinction that is governed by 
the ADA. "Mental conditions" include a broad array of ailments, 
some of which might be disabilities, such as major depression or 
multiple personality disorder, and many of which are not, such as 
low self esteem, temporary grief, and anxiety arising from marital 
problems.88 Because limitations on reimbursement for treatment 
of mental conditions do not affect only disabilities, they cannot be 
said to be disability-based distinctions.89 
The conclusion that the ADA was not designed to prohibit 
insurance providers from offering beneficiaries less coverage for 
mental conditions than for physical conditions is bolstered by the 
fact that Congress passed the Mental Health Parity Act 
("MHP A")90 in 1996, six years after the passage of the ADA. The 
81 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For a discussion of the Chevron principle see infra note 147. 
83 See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 642. 
84 See id. at 642-47. 
85 See id. at 636. 
86 See id. 
87 The EEOC, in its guidance, uses the example of an AIDS cap as an illustration of a 
disability-based distinction. EEOC Interim Guidance on Application of ADA to Health 
Insurance, EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) No. 176, N:2301, at N:2304 (June 8, 1993). See 
also, World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203, 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (stating that "it is 
clear that, as an individual with AIDS, [the] defendant is disabled under the ADA"). 
88 See Employee Benefits, supra note 72, at 627:0023. 
89 See id. (concluding that "such distinctions in health insurance plans thus will not 
generally violate the ADA"). See also discussion of disparate impact analysis, supra Part 
I.B.3. 
90 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (1994 & Supp. 2001). 
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legislation required that certain group health plans that provide 
both physical and mental health care benefits apply the same 
aggregate lifetime limits to both.91 Had Congress believed that the 
ADA already prohibited such coverage disparities, it is unlikely 
that it would have passed the subsequent law.92 Moreover, the 
MHP A fell far short of mandating complete parity between 
benefits for mental health care and benefits for physical health 
care. The law did not apply to employers with fewer than fifty 
employees93 or to those who would experience a cost increase of 
one percent or more as a result of enhancing mental health care 
coverage.94 The statute also had a sunset provision that rendered it 
inapplicable to "benefits for services furnished on or after 
September 30, 2001," and thus it expired five years after its 
enactment.95 It is umeasonable to construe the ADA as requiring 
absolute parity in light of the fact that Congress later passed a less 
restrictive statute without explicitly stating that it meant to revise 
the ADA standard. 
The relatively narrow definition of "disability-based 
distinction" significantly limits the applicability of the ADA's anti-
discrimination mandate to health insurance. This is particularly 
true in light of the Supreme Court's mandate that mitigating 
measures be considered in determining whether an individual has 
a "disability,"a requirement that precludes many serious 
conditions from being deemed disabilities. Furthermore, benefit 
exclusions or limitations that affect both people with disabilities 
and those without disabilities are not disability-based distinctions. 
Because the ADA prohibits only disability discrimination and not 
other types of discrimination, the question of whether a 
discriminatory insurance term is a disability-based distinction is 
the threshold question in any ADA inquiry. If the benefits term is 
91 ld . . 
92 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A M.A. TIER OF INTERPRETATION 16-17 (1997). Scalia states: 
Another accepted rule of construction is that ambiguities in a newly enacted 
statute are to be resolved in such fashion as to make the statute, not only 
internally consistent, but also compatible with previously enacted laws. We 
simply assume, for purposes of our search for 'intent,' that the enacting 
legislature was aware of all those other laws. 
ld. at 16. Justice Scalia disagrees with this approach, believing that it is based on "fiction." 
He argues that it is unrealistic to assume that legislatures debating a particular bill are 
intimately familiar with all arguably relevant prior legislation. See id. at 16-17. In this 
case, however, it would be umeasonable to think that the authors of the MHP A, which 
directly addresses disability discrimination, were ignorant of the ADA, a very well-
publicized and often cited law that was passed only six years earlier, in 1990. 
93 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-5(c)(1), 300gg-91(e)(4). 
94 Jd. § 300gg-5(c)(2). 
95 Id. § 300gg-5(f). 
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not a disability-based distinction, it cannot be challenged under the 
statute and no further inquiry need be made. 
C. Title I and Title III of the ADA 
1. Title I and Insurance Policies 
Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in employment 
and thus forbids employers from discriminating against individuals 
with disabilities with respect to health insurance benefits.96 
Likewise, an employer may not engage in a contractual or other 
relationship that has the effect of subjecting qualified applicants or 
employees with disabilities to discrimination.97 Consequently, an 
employer may not contract with a third-party insurer to provide its 
employees with health insurance that is unlawfully discriminatory. 
This prohibition is significant because approximately sixty-five 
percent of Americans under the age of sixty-five receive health 
insurance benefits through employers.98 Sixty percent of all small 
firms offered their employees health insurance benefits in 1999, 
and virtually all employers with 200 or more employees offer 
health benefits.99 
An employer who offers its employees health insurance 
benefits cannot refuse to provide insurance benefits to a person 
with a disability even if the cost of insuring such an individual will 
be high. 100 However, if an insurance plan offered by an employer 
contains a disability-based distinction, that plan will not 
automatically violate the ADA, and its legality will be evaluated in 
light of section 501( c) and other defenses, discussed below. 101 
96 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 
97 42 u.s.c. § 12112(b)(2). 
98 See Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured: 
Analysis of the March I999 Current Population Survey, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, Jan. 2000, at 1, 
4. 
99 See THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION AND HEALTH RESEARCH AND 
EDUCATIONAL TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 1999 ANNUAL SURVEY 25 
(1999), 
100 Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store of Del., 924 F. Supp. 763, 780 (E. D. Tex 1996) 
(stating that "complete denial [of health insurance benefits] is a per se violation of the 
ADA's mandate that employers provide individuals with disabilities equal access to group 
health insurance"). 
101 See EEOC Interim Guidance, supra note 73. See also discussion infra Part I. D. 
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2. Title III and Insurance Policies 
Title III of the ADA reads in relevant part: "[n]o individual 
shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full 
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or 
operates a place of public accommodation. "102 A "place of public 
accommodation" is defined by the ADA as including an insurance 
office.103 A plain reading of the language of this provision reveals 
that it prohibits discrimination not only with respect to physical 
access to insurance offices, but also with respect to the goods 
offered by insurance offices, i.e., insurance policies. The scope of 
this anti-discrimination prohibition, however, has been vigorously 
debated in the courts. 
First, the courts that have addressed the issue agree that if an 
individual receives health insurance benefits through her 
employer, she cannot both sue her employer under Title I and sue 
the insurance company or administrator of the plan under Title III 
of the ADA. 104 The courts reason that if an employee obtains 
insurance through her employer, she has not acquired the benefits 
from a place of public accommodation and has no direct nexus to 
the insurance office.105 In the words of one court, "a benefit plan 
provided by an employer is not a good offered by a place of public 
accommodation. As is evident by § 12187(7) [sic], a public 
accommodation is a physical place .... "106 Consequently, according 
to the courts, an individual receiving employer-provided health 
benefits can sue only her employer under Title I and cannot utilize 
Title III of the ADA. 
The reasoning of the courts, however, is unsound. The text of 
Title III does not limit its applicability only to cases in which the 
plaintiff obtained goods or services directly from the place of 
public accommodation. Rather, it prohibits those who own, lease, 
or operate places of public accommodations, including insurance 
offices, from subjecting individuals with disabilities to 
102 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 
103 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F). 
104 See, e.g., Leonard v. Israel Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting the 
issue but deciding the case on other grounds); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 
601, 612-613 (3rd Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1011-12 (6th 
Cir. 1997); Lenox v. Healthwise of Kentucky, Ltd., 149 F.3d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1998); 
Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114-1115 (9th Cir. 2000). 
105 See cases listed supra note 104. 
106 Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010. 
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discrimination with respect to their goods or services. There is no 
reason why the existence of an intermediary, such as an employer, 
through whom the plaintiff obtains the merchandise, should render 
Title III inapplicable. Surely, if a store owner refused to sell his 
products to the administrators of a rehabilitation center for the 
disabled because he did not want individuals with disabilities to 
enjoy his goods, the residents would be able to sue the store owner 
even though they did not directly attempt to purchase the goods. 
Likewise, individuals with disabilities who are offered unlawfully 
discriminatory health insurance through their employers should be 
able to sue the insurance company that provided the 
discriminatory policy .107 
A second issue with which the courts have grappled is the 
scope of Title III's anti-discrimination prohibition. The courts 
agree that Title III bars insurance companies from refusing to sell 
insurance policies to persons with disabilities because of their 
disabilities and consequently requires them to ensure that 
individuals with disabilities have access to their services.108 
However, the circuit courts that have addressed the issue have 
held that the ADA does not govern the contents of insurance 
policies and thus that the courts have no authority to scrutinize 
benefit exclusions and limitations such as AIDS caps. 109 The 
107 Because Title I is enforced by the EEOC, and Title III is enforced by the DOJ, each 
agency has issued guidelines regarding the respective Title under its jurisdiction, and 
neither has addressed the interrelationship between the two. See Employee Benefits, supra 
note 72; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.16(f) (2000); 28 C.F.R. § 36.212 (2000). Consequently, no 
administrative agency guidance exists concerning an individual's right to sue under both 
Titles. 
108 Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance, 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999); Parker, 121 
F.3d at 1012 ("Title III regulates the availability of the goods and services the place of 
public accommodation offers"); McNeil v. Time Ins. Co., 205 F3d. 179, 186 (5th Cir. 2000) 
("Title III prohibits the owner, operator, lessee, or lessor from denying the disabled access 
to, or interfering with their enjoyment of, the goods and services of a place of public 
accommodation"); Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 33 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[A]n 
entity covered by Title III is not only obligated by the statute to provide disabled persons 
with physical access, but is also prohibited from refusing to sell them its merchandise by 
reason of discrimination against their disability"). 
109 Doe, 179 F.3d at 562 (stating that the ADA "regulates only access and not content"); 
Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1115 ("[A]n insurance office must be physically accessible to the 
disabled but need not provide insurance that treats the disabled equally with the non-
disabled"); Parker, 121 F.3d at 1012 ("Title III does not govern the content of a long-term 
disability policy offered by an employer"); Ford, 145 F.3d at 608 ("So long as every 
employee is offered the same plan regardless of that employee's contemporary or future 
disability status, then no discrimination has occurred even if the plan offers different 
coverage for various disabilities"); McNeil, 205 F.3d at 185 ("Title III does not. .. regulate 
the content of goods and services that are offered"). 
Some district courts have found to the contrary. See, e.g., World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 
966 F. Supp. 1203, 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (noting that the ADA "requires that underwriting 
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conclusion of the courts that have interpreted the ADA so 
narrowly is unfounded. To analyze the decisions, however, one 
must tum to Section 501 (c) of the statute. 
D. The Meaning of Section 501 (c) 
Section 501(c) of the ADA states the following: 
[T]his Act shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict-
(1) an insurer, hospital or medical service company, health 
maintenance organization, or any agent, or entity that 
administers benefit plans, or similar organizations from 
underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks 
that are based on or not inconsistent with State law; or 
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from 
establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms 
of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, 
classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or 
not inconsistent with State law; or 
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from 
establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms 
of a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to State laws that 
regulate insurance. 
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to 
evade the purposes of [the Act).110 
Most courts that have interpreted this provision perceive it as an 
almost complete defense for insurers.111 
The courts correctly note that the ADA does not require that 
insurers provide equal benefits for different disabilities.m As 
stated above, however, the courts have carried this principle too 
and classification of risks be based on sound actuarial principles or be related to actual or 
reasonably anticipated experience"); Clouter v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 964 F. Supp. 
299, 304 (N.D. Cal. 1997) ("[I]nsurers retain their § 501(c) exemption so long as their 
underwriting decisions are in accord with either (a) sound actuarial principles, or (b) 
actual or reasonably anticipated experience"); Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. 982 F. Supp. 
1158, 1169 ("[T]he Aetna plan's distinction between physical and mental disabilities may 
survive scrutiny under the ADA only if it is based on actuarial principles or other 
competent factual information"); Doukas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422,432 (D. 
N.H. 1996) ("[W]hile insurers retain the ability to follow practices consistent with 
insurance risk classification accepted under state law, these methods must still be based on 
sound actuarial principles or related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience"). 
no 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994). 
111 See e.g., Doe, 179 F.3d at 562 ("[S]ection 501(c) is obviously intended for the benefit 
of insurance companies rather than plaintiffs."). 
112 Parker, 121 F.3d at 1015; Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1116; Ford, 145 F.3d at 608; Wilson, 117 
F. Supp. 2d at 95. 
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far and have in most cases concluded that "the content of the 
goods or services offered by a place of public accommodation is 
not regulated. "113 Thus, in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha, 114 the 
defendant conceded that its AIDS cap was not based on any 
actuarial principle or economic experience, and yet the court 
found that the AIDS cap was lawful and consistent with the 
ADA's anti-discrimination mandate. The courts have explicitly 
ruled that the "subterfuge" language of section 501(c) does not 
require insurers to justify their benefit terms when they are 
challenged by plaintiffsY5 Courts have also protested that they 
"are not equipped to become the watchdog of the insurance 
business"ttfi by engaging in analysis of actuarial datam and assert 
that intrusion by the courts could lead to a destabilizing "seismic 
shift in the insurance business." tts By contrast, I argue that section 
501(c) imposes an obligation on insurers to provide a cost-based 
justification for discriminatory benefit limitations or exclusions 
and provides a defense only for those who can do so. 
1. The Plain Text of Section SOl( c) 
To say that section 501( c) imposes no restrictions upon the 
benefit terms that can be implemented by insurers and that it 
leaves them free of the obligation to justify challenged exclusions 
and limitations is to ignore the provision's plain language. If the 
ADA intended to prohibit only an insurer's refusal to deal with 
disabled individuals, it would have stated so explicitly. Section 
501(c) could have simply directed that insurance providers cannot 
refuse to provide insurance policies to individuals with disabilities 
because of their disabilities. 
Instead, the statute discusses the permissible activities of 
underw1iting risks, classifying risks, and administering risks, and 
the impermissible conduct of implementing terms that are contrary 
to state law or are used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of 
the ADA.tt 9 It is therefore ludicrous to conclude that the statute 
does not instruct the courts to scrutinize insurers' policy terms to 
m Doe, 179 F.3d at 560. See also cases listed supra note 109. 
ll4 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999). 
ll5 See Ford, 145 F.3d at 612; Whaley v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (D. Neb. 
2000); Bythway v. Principal Health Care of Del. Inc., 1999 WL 33220042 at*3. 
tt6 Ford, 145 F.3d at 612. 
tl7 See Bythway, 1999 WL 33220042, at *3. 
ns Ford, 145 F.3d at 612. See also Bythway, 1999 WL 33220042, at *3. 
ll9 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994). 
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verify that they are based on permissible practices and do not 
contain impermissible components. Moreover, the statute 
generally prohibits disability discrimination with respect to 
insurance120 but qualifies this prohibition by providing an exception 
for the traditionally valid practices of "underwriting risks, 
classifying risks, or administering risks." It follows that if insurers 
adopt a discriminatory exclusion or limitation that is not based on 
one of the above mechanisms, the discriminatory benefit term 
should be deemed unlawful. Again, this determination requires 
justification of the challenged benefit term by the insurer and 
judicial scrutiny. 
The term "underwriting risks" refers to an insurer's decision 
concerning whether, and on what basis, to accept a particular 
customer.121 The practice of classifying risks is the 
"[c]ategorization on the basis of established criteria for rating 
risks, establishing premiums and tabulating statistical 
experience."122 The term "administering risks" is not specifically 
defined in the insurance literature, but it most probably relates 
simply to the administration of the insurance plan. The commonly 
accepted principles that underlie risk classification practices are 
that the system should reflect expected cost differences, should 
distinguish among 1isks on the basis of relevant cost factors, and 
should be applied objectively.123 Moreover, it is commonly 
accepted that risk classification practices should promote 
efficiency and fairness, and therefore, equal risks are not to be 
treated differently and unequal risks are not to be treated the 
same.124 
Consequently, in permitting insurers to underwrite and 
classify risks, the ADA is pennitting them to engage in a process 
of analysis of expected costs and experience involving different 
risks. The statute cannot reasonably be construed as allowing 
insurers to exclude or limit benefits for the treatment of disabilities 
on an arbitrary or irrational basis. If insurers were allowed to do 
so, the ADA's reference to the underwriting, classifying, and 
administration of risks would have no meaning, and the statute's 
120 I d. §§ 12112(a), 12182(a), 12181(7)(F). 
121 See Karen A Oifford & Russel P. Inculano, AIDS and 111Surance: The Rationale for 
AIDS-Related Testing, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1806, 1809 (1987). See also Pmllip E. Stano, 
Underwriting in the Twentieth Century: Grafting Societal Values to the Regulation of Risk, 
19 J. INS. REG. 273, 275 (2000); RUPP, supra note 22, at 335. 
122 RUPP, supra note 22, at 76. 
123 See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES COMM. ON RISK CLASSIFICATION, RISK 
CLASSIFICATION STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 2 (1980). 
124 See id. at 8; KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 10-11 (1986); Stano supra 
note 121 at 275-76. 
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prohibition of discrimination with respect to insurance benefits 
would have no force. 
The courts' concern that judicial intrusion would generate 
destabilization in the insurance industry is groundless. Requiring 
insurers to avoid unfair discrimination and to base benefit terms 
on actuarial analysis is consistent with existing insurance 
principles. It is, in fact, what insurers are purportedly doing on 
their own, and thus, the ADA merely formalizes what insurers 
already understand to be their professional obligation. While 
insurers have ample incentive to exclude or limit coverage for the 
treatments that are going to be most costly for the plan, they have 
a much weaker economic incentive to refuse reimbursement for 
AIDS treatment or hearing devices if these are expected to be 
sought rarely and to be less costly than other treatments that are 
covered. 125 Exclusion or limitation of coverage for therapies that 
will generate low expenditures for the health insurance plan will 
not significantly reduce its expenses or prevent premiums from 
rising. If the courts are called upon to ensure that challenged 
insurance terms are based on valid analysis of cost data and are 
not randomly discriminatory disability-based distinctions, the 
courts will not in any way cause a "seismic shift"t26 in the insurance 
industry. Rather, they will reinforce the industry's integrity and 
underlying principles. 
The courts' objection that they are not equipped to evaluate 
financial and actuarial data is similarly unconvincing. The ADA 
explicitly requires courts to engage in complex economic analysis 
in other contexts. Title I of the ADA requires employers to 
provide reasonable accmmnodations for individuals with 
l25 See Herman T. Bailey, The Regulatory Challenge to Life Insurance Classification, 25 
DRAKE L. REv. INS. L. ANN. 779, 824 (1976) ("Insurers are not concerned with 
stereotyping individuals on the basis of whim, prejudice or surmise, but rather seek to 
classify them on the basis of factors with statistically demonstrable relationships to the cost 
of providing coverage."). In some cases insurers will be able to show that an AIDS cap, 
for example, is based on expected cost-related factors. If many members of a particular 
group have HIV or AIDS, then treatment for this illness may well be more expensive for 
the plan that other covered therapies. Nevertheless, many defendants, like Mutual of 
Omaha Insurance Company, will not be able to provide a cost-based justification for their 
AIDS cap. The average lifetime health care costs for AIDS-related conditions was 
estimated in 1999 to be $155,000. See Nancy R. Mansfield, Evolving Limitations on 
Coverage for AIDS: Implications for Health Insurers and Employers under the ADA and 
ERISA, 35 TORT & INs. L.J. 117, 117 (1999). Other procedures and therapies that are 
routinely covered, such as liver transplants and end-stage renal disease care are more 
costly for insurers. See id. at 132. Moreover, in the aggregate, it is more expensive for 
insurers to cover treatment for heart and liver disease and for cancer than it is to cover 
treatment for less frequently occurring diseases such as AIDS. See id. at 132-33. 
L26 Ford v. Schering-Piough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612 (3rd Cir. 1998). 
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disabilities unless the accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship upon the employer.127 The statute further provides that in 
order to determine whether an undue hardship would exist, the 
court must consider the following four factors: (1) the nature and 
cost of the needed accommodation; (2) the overall financial 
resources of the facility involved; (3) the overall financial 
resources of the employer as a whole, including all its facilities; and 
( 4) the employer's general operations.128 Similarly, Title III of the 
ADA provides an undue burden defense for public 
accommodations that cannot accommodate individuals with 
disabilities.129 Presumably, an employer asserting an undue burden 
defense in the Title III context would have to offer the court proof 
that is similar to that required under Title I. If courts can evaluate 
complex financial data in order to determine the validity of an 
entity's undue hardship defense, there is no reason why they 
127 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994). The provision reads in relevant part: 
(b) ... the term "discriminate" includes-
(5)(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an 
applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the 
business of such covered entity; 
!d. 
!d. 
]d. 
128 42 U.S. C. § 12111(10)(B). The text provides: 
(B) Factors to be considered. - In determining whether an accommodation 
would impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered 
include-
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter; 
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the 
provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at 
such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of 
such accommodation upon the operation of the facility; 
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the 
business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the 
number, type, and location of its facilities; and 
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the 
composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the 
geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or 
facilities in question to the covered entity. 
129 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b )(2)(A)(iii). The text provides: 
(A) ... discrimination includes-
( iii) a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individucl 
with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated 
differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and 
services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, 
or accommodation being offered or would result in an undue burden; 
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should be deemed ill-equipped to evaluate financial data for 
purposes of a section 501 (c) defense. 
One problem that might arise is that insurers will offer 
actuarial data that is out -dated or unreliable, since such data, 
unfortunately, is often utilized in the risk-classification process.U0 
As is the case generally in litigation, however, it will be up to the 
plaintiff to convince the court that it should not rely on the 
defendant's flawed evidence, and the courts will have to be trusted 
to reach the correct conclusion. 
2. The Term "Subterfuge" 
Much of the controversy relating to section 501(c) revolves 
around the meaning of the term "subterfuge." I suggest, however, 
that the emphasis on that word is misplaced. The "subterfuge" 
provision adds a further prohibition that will apply in exceptional 
cases, but it is not central to the meaning of the entirety of section 
SOl( c). 
The courts that have interpreted section 501(c) as providing a 
comprehensive defense for insurers rely on the Supreme Court 
case of Public Employee Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts. 131 The 
case involved an age discrimination challenge to a plan that 
disqualified employees from eligibility for disability retirement 
benefits upon reaching the age of sixty. 132 At the time, the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") 133 contained a 
provision that is similar to the ADA's section 501(c). Section 
4(f)(2) of the ADEA provided an exemption for activities 
undertaken to observe "the terms of ... any bona fide employee 
benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, 
which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the ADEA]."134 
In the Betts case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier 
United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann 135 holding that '"subterfuge' 
means 'a scheme, plan stratagem, or artifice of evasion,' which, in 
130 Insurers have been criticized for making risk classification decisions that are not · 
actuarially sound. See, e.g., Donald W. Light, The Practice and Ethics of Risk-Related 
Health Insurance, 267 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2503, 2505 (1992); Jolm Jacobi, The Ends of 
Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 311, 329 (1997); 28 C.F.R. § 36.212 (2000). 
m 492 U.S. 158 (1989). 
132 See id. at 162. 
133 29 U.S. C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. 1999). See infra in Part II.C, for a more detailed 
discussion of the AD EA. 
134 29 U.S. C. § 623(f)(2). The section was amended in 1990 and no longer contains the 
"subterfuge" language. For the section's current text, see infra note 233. 
135 434 U.S. 192 (1977). 
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the context of § 4(f)(2), connotes a specific 'intent ... to evade a 
statutory requirement. "'136 It rejected EEOC guidelines that 
construed the subterfuge clause as requiring cost justification for 
age discrimination in benefit plans.137 The Court reasoned that the 
EEOC guidelines were not due any deference because they were 
contrary to the plain language of the ADEA.138 Consequently, a 
plan adopted p1ior to the ADEA's enactment could not constitute 
a subterfuge because it could not have been conceived with an 
intent to evade the statutory purpose.139 Finally, the Betts Court 
held that in order to prove subterfuge, plaintiffs must prove that 
the challenged plan provision was intended to discriminate in an 
aspect of employment that is not itself related to fringe benefits, 
such as to retaliate against an employee who filed a charge of 
discrimination or to reduce the net earnings of older employees.140 
The courts that have adopted the Betts interpretation in the 
ADA context have reasoned that Congress must have 
incorporated the term "subterfuge" into the ADA in 1990 in light 
of the Supreme Court's Betts decision in 1989 and thus intended 
the term to have identical meanings in the two statutes.141 This 
interpretation bolsters their conclusion that the ADA does not 
govern the contents of insurance policies because, under the Betts 
precedent, benefit terms should not be vulnerable to judicial 
scrutiny unless they were adopted specifically with discriminatory 
intent.142 Here too, however, the courts' reasoning is unsound. 
Whether the Betts interpretation of "subterfuge" was right or 
wrong, the two provisions at issue are easily distinguishable. First, 
the ADEA's subterfuge clause was very different from that found 
136 Betts, 492 U.S. at 171 (citing McMann, 434 U.S. at 203). 
137 Id. at 170-71. The EEOC regulation provided that "[I]n general, a plan or plan 
provision which prescribes lower benefits for older employees on account of age is not a 
'subterfuge' within the meaning of section 4(f)(2), provided that the lower level of benefits 
is justified by age-related cost consideration." ld. at 170, (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10(d) 
(1988)). 
138 See id. at 171. 
139 See id. at 167-68. 
140 See id. at 180-81. 
141 Leonard v. Israel Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[W]hen 
Congress chose the term 'subterfuge' for the insurance safe-harbor of the ADA, it was on 
full alert as to what the court understood the word to mean and possessed (obviously) a 
full grasp of the linguistic devices available to avoid that meaning"); Ford v. Schering-
Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 611 (3rd Cir. 1998) ("Congress ... is presumed to have 
adopted the Supreme Court's interpretation of 'subterfuge' in the ADEA context when 
Congress enacted the ADA"); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679 (8th 
Cir. 1996) ("Had Congress intended to reject the Betts interpretation of subterfuge when 
it enacted the ADA, it could have done so expressly by incorporating language for that 
purpose into the bill"). 
142 See cases listed supra note 141. 
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in the ADA. Unlike section 501(c), the ADEA's provision made 
no mention of risk classification or underwriting practices. As 
argued previously, by referring to these mechanisms, the ADA 
mandates that only legitimate cost analysis will justify an otherwise 
discriminatory benefit term. Second, in 1990 Congress removed 
the subterfuge clause from the ADEA, and thus it did not retain 
two provisions that contain identical words that should be 
construed as having identical meanings. It cannot, therefore, be 
argued that section 501( c) excuses all insurer conduct that was not 
specifically intended to evade the purpose of the statute. 
Accordingly, it is incorrect to conclude that plans adopted 
before the ADA are exempt from the anti-discrimination mandate 
because they could not have been implemented with an intent to 
evade the purposes of the ADA.143 Rather, benefit terms that 
discriminate on the basis of disability must be scrutinized by the 
courts on their own merit to determine whether they comply with 
statutory requirements. 
Nevertheless, I propose that the term "subterfuge" in section 
501(c) can be read to mean "with an intent to evade statutory 
purposes," as it does according to the Betts Court, without 
weakening the argument that the provision as a whole requires 
cost justification. Because the cost analysis is required by the 
ADA's reference to "underwriting risks, classifying risks, or 
administering risks" in the first two paragraphs of the provision, 
the discussion of subterfuge likely has a different purpose. 
Specifically, the subterfuge clause provides that "Paragraphs 
(1), (2), and (3) [of section SOl( c)] shall not be used as a subterfuge 
to evade the purposes of [the Act] .... "144 This language imposes 
an additional obligation on insurance providers that goes beyond 
those addressed in the first three paragraphs. An insurance 
provider whose disability-based distinction is challenged under the 
ADA can avoid liability by proving that the distinction is 
consistent with cost-based risk classification and underwriting 
principles. However, a defendant who provides a valid 
justification, will nonetheless be found to have violated the ADA 
if the plaintiff proves that the discriminatory benefit term was 
adopted with an intent to discriminate rather than purely to save 
costs. 
For example, an insurer may be able to prove that its AIDS 
cap is actuarially justified because of very high anticipated costs in 
the insured pool. However, if the plaintiff produces an internal 
143 See Leonard, 199 F.3d at 105. 
144 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994). 
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memo stating that the AIDS cap was in truth adopted because the 
insurer believes people with AIDS cause their own illness by 
engaging in immoral conduct, deserve to be sick, and should not 
receive medical treatment, the section 501( c) defense will not 
apply. The coverage limitation was adopted in order to 
discriminate against individuals with AIDS, and not solely for 
reasons of cost. Similarly, if an employer is shown to have adopted 
a policy with an AIDS cap because it wanted an employee with 
AIDS to resign, the AIDS cap will be deemed a subterfuge, in 
violation of the ADA, even if the employer can prove an actuarial 
basis for it. 
3. Administrative Guidance 
Administrative guidance has been issued by the EEOC 
regarding the application of the ADA's Title I to health insurance, 
and by the DOJ, which enforces Title III, and both have provided 
consistent interpretations of section 501(c).145 Under Chevron 
USA. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 146 reasonable 
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions are 
entitled to judicial deference.147 The circuit courts have generally 
ignored the agencies' guidance, and one court explicitly rejected it, 
stating that it is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.148 
However, as is evident from the courts' repeated struggles to 
interpret section 501 (c), the provision's plain meaning is not free 
of ambiguity and requires lengthy explication. The administrative 
145 Employee Benefits, supra note 72; EEOC Interim Guidance, supra note 73; 29 C.P.R. 
§ 1630.16(f) (2000); 28 C.F.R. § 36.212 (2000). 
146 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
147 See id. at 842-44. In Chevron, the Supreme Court developed a two-step analysis to 
determine the degree of judicial deference appropriate for administrative interpretations 
of law. First, the court must determine whether the statute clearly speaks to the question 
at hand, and if so, the court must implement the plainly expressed intent of Congress. If, 
however, the statute does not address the pertinent issue or provides ambiguous guidance, 
courts should accept any reasonable interpretation offered by the enforcing administrative 
agency. See id. 
The Chevron decision can be explained through several rationales. First, 
administrative agencies have expertise with respect to the legislation at issue and practical 
knowledge regarding administration of the statutory scheme. Second, the decision 
reinforces the separation of powers by assigning policy judgments to the executive branch 
rather than the courts. Tlllrd, according to Justice Scalia, in some cases Congress had no 
specific intent with respect to the question at issue and meant to leave its resolution to the 
administrative agency. Chevron thus instructs courts to implement Congressional intent 
by deferring to agency guidance. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L. J. 511,514-16 (1989). 
148 See Leonard v. Israel Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 106 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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guidelines that have been issued are detailed and thoughtful. 
Because the EEOC and DOJ have provided reasonable and 
consistent guidance, their statutory interpretations should receive 
deference from the courts. 
The DOJ's Title III Technical Assistance Manual explains: 
[A] public accommodation may offer [an insurance] plan that 
limits certain kinds of coverage based on classification of risk, 
but may not refuse to insure, or refuse to continue to insure, or 
limit the amount, extent, or kind of coverage available to an 
individual, or charge a different rate for the same coverage 
solely because of a physical or mental impairment, except 
where the refusal, limitation, or rate differential is based on 
sound actuarial principles or is related to actual or reasonably 
anticipated experience. 149 
Likewise, in commenting on an employer's obligations with 
respect to health insurance, the EEOC explains that "[t]he 
employer may prove that the disability-based disparate treatment 
is justified by legitimate actuarial data, or by actual or reasonably 
anticipated experience, and that conditions with comparable 
actuarial data and/or experience are treated the same way. " 150 
149 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: TITLE III 
TECHNICAL AsSISTANCE MANUAL III-3.11000 (1993). In addition, the DOJ's 
interpretive guidance states that "[b]ecause the legislative history of the ADA clarifies 
that different treatment of individuals with disabilities in insurance may be justified by 
sound actuarial data, such actuarial data will be critical to any potential litigation on this 
issue." 28 C.F.R. § 36.212 (2000). 
150 Employee Benefits, supra note 72, at 627:0024. The guidance continues: 
Actuarial data will measure both the likelihood that the employer will incur 
insurance costs related to the disability and the magnitude of those costs as they 
arise. Thus, employers must show that the reduction in coverage for the 
disability or disabilities is required to account for an increased possibility that 
the benefit will be claimed or that the amounts required for coverage will be 
higher. Employers may not, however, rely on actuarial data that is outdated or 
that is based on myths, fears, stereotypes, or assumptions about the disability at 
issue. 
Even where employers can produce actuarial data that demonstrates that the 
risks and costs of treatment of a condition justify differential treatment of it, 
employers must also show that they have treated other conditions that pose the 
same risks and costs the same way. If there is evidence that an employer has 
treated other conditions differently from the disability at issue, the employer has 
discriminated by singling out a particular disability for disadvantageous 
treatment. 
I d. The EEOC provides this explanation as an interpretation of the term "subterfuge." 
As argued above, I believe that the EEOC is correct in stating that section 501(c) requires 
actuarial justification for disability-based distinctions, but I argue that cost analysis is 
mandated by the provision's reference to the underwriting and classifying of risks, not by 
the term "subterfuge." 
In addition, the EEOC guidance focuses on section 501(c)'s requirement that an 
insurance plan be "bona fide." The guidance provides the following explanation 
concerning the term "bona fide": 
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Thus, both agencies conclude that the ADA governs the content of 
insurance policies and that insurance providers must furnish a cost-
based justification for challenged disability-based distinctions. 
The EEOC offers additional defenses for employers whose 
insurance plans contain disability-based distinctions. Employers 
can prove that the different treatment is necessary to maintain the 
solvency of the benefit plan151 or "to avoid unacceptable changes in 
the coverage of, or the premiums for, a benefit plan. "152 Although 
the EEOC does not explicitly state this, these defenses seem to 
arise from the general principle that employers are excused from 
accommodating individuals with disabilities if the accommodation 
will cause them undue hardship.153 While DOJ guidelines do not 
address the issue, it is reasonable to conclude that insurers could 
similarly avoid liability under Title III by asserting an "undue 
burden" defense, because the defense is available not only to 
employers, but also to public accommodations.154 
EEOC guidance also explicitly rejects application of the Betts 
Under the tirst prong of the defense, an employer must demonstrate that its plan 
is either a bonafide insured plan that is not inconsistent with state law, or a bona 
fide self-insured plan. (In a footnote, the EEOC explains that self-insured plans 
are not subject to state laws that regulate insurance]. To be bona fide, a plan 
must exist and pay benefits; in addition, the terms of the plan must have been 
accurately communicated to eligible employees. 
I d. at 627:0023. 
I d. 
151 I d. at 627:0024. The guidance elaborates: 
To establish this defense, employers must show: 
• that covering the disability or disabilities at issue would require such 
substantial payments of benefits that it would threaten the fiscal soundness of 
the plan under commonly accepted or legally required standards, and 
• that there is no non-disability-based benefit plan change that could be made to 
limit those fiscal consequences. 
152 /d. The guidance further explains: 
An "unacceptable" change is a drastic increase in premium payments (or in co-
payments or deductibles), or a drastic alteration to the scope of coverage or level 
of benefits provided, that would: 
• increase the cost to other employees so substantially that the benefit plan 
would be effectively unavailable to a significant number of them; 
• make the benefit plan so unattractive as to result in significant adverse 
selection; or 
e make the benefit plan so unattractive that the employer carmot compete in 
recruiting and maintaining qualified workers due to the superiority of benefit 
plans offered by other employers in the community. 
ld. The guidance also provides a final, rather obvious defense for an employer, which is 
that it can prove "that a particular treatment that it has excluded from a health insurance 
plan provides no medical benefit." !d. 
153 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(S)(A) (1994). See Marcosson, supra note 7, at 429-30, for 
criticism that EEOC guidelines are too lenient and create too many loopholes for 
employers. 
154 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b )(2)(A)(iii). 
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decision to ADA cases.155 The EEOC asserts that the ADA 
applies to plans that were adopted prior to the statute's enactment 
and to insurance terms that are facially discriminatory even if they 
do not discriminate with respect to non-benefit employment 
decisions. 156 
4. Legislative History 
Reliance on legislative history is disfavored by the current 
Supreme Court.t57 Reportedly, during the 1981 term, the Court 
utilized legislative history in almost all of its statutory cases,t58 but 
by 1993, only a small number of cases analyzed legislative history, 
and no majority opinion cited legislative history as essential to its 
decision.t59 As demonstrated above, section 501(c) can be 
interpreted based on its text and in light of the detailed and 
reasonable administrative guidelines that were developed by the 
DOJ and EEOC. Nevertheless, as some scholars have argued, 
legislative history can be valuable in interpreting difficult text, tfio 
tss See Employee Benefits, supra note 72, at 627:0024. 
156 See id. 
157 Justice Scalia in particular has argued vigorously against the use of legislative history 
as an authoritative source for a statute's meaning. See Scalia, supra note 145, at 16, 29-36. 
Scalia believes that legislative intent is not a proper criterion for statutory interpretation 
since judges must focus on what the legislature said, not what it might have theoretically 
intended. Furthermore, Scalia notes that floor debates are generally poorly attended and 
committee reports are rarely read, and thus it is naive to believe that legislators vote 
according to what they hear during debates or read in reports. In fact, he believes that in 
many cases language contained in floor debates or committee reports is prewritten by 
lawyer-lobbyists who have access to sympathetic legislators and wish to shape the 
legislative history for purposes of future judicial interpretation. According to Scalia, any 
significant statute will be accompanied by extensive legislative history that will contain 
statements that potentially support varied and even contradictory understandings of the 
text. Thus, it is only the enacted statute itself that represents actual Congressional intent. 
Scalia concludes that if legislative history is abandoned as an interpretive tool, "[i]udges, 
lawyers, and clients will be saved an enormous amount of [wasted] time and expense." I d. 
at36. 
l58 See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on rhe Use of Legislative History in the 
1981 Supreme Court Tem1, 68 I ow A L. REv. 195, 196-98 (1983). 
l59 See Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine: In 
Defense of Justice Scalia, 28 CONN. L. REv. 393, 398 (1996) (noting that Justice Scalia 
joined the Court during the 1988 term). See also Stephen Breyer, The 1991 Justice Lester 
W Roth Lecture: On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 845, 846 (1992) (noting that in the 1990 term, the Supreme Court decided nineteen 
out of approximately fifty-five statutory cases without the use of legislative history). 
160 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME 224 (1999) (arguing that when terms 
are ambiguous or provisions are excessively broad, legislative history should be used as an 
interpretive mechanism because "[w]ords are hard to understand without some conception 
of their purpose, and the distinction between purpose and intention ... is thin"). See also 
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and thus, the ADA's legislative history merits some attention. 
The legislative history supports the view that the ADA is 
intended to govern the content of health insurance policies and to 
require actuarial or cost-based justification for disability-based 
distinctions. The issue of insurance is addressed in three 
committee reports: the Senate Labor and Human Resources 
Committee report, the House Education and Labor Committee 
report, and the House Judiciary Committee report. 161 Professor 
Chai Feldblum, one of the authors of the ADA, has stated that the 
language of the Senate Labor Committee report was "negotiated, 
line by line, among all parties" including the insurance companies, 
lawyers for the disability community, and Senate staff.162 Its value, 
therefore, cannot be discounted under the theory that it represents 
the view of only one special interest group that lobbied 
Congress.163 
The Senate report states the following: 
[W]hile a plan which limits certain kinds of coverage based on 
classification of risk would be allowed under this section, the 
plan may not refuse to insure, or refuse to continue to insure, or 
limit the amount, extent, or kind of coverage available to an 
individual, or charge a different rate for the same coverage 
solely because of a physical or mental impairment, except 
where the refusal, limitation, or rate differential is based on 
sound actuarial principles or is related to actual or reasonably 
anticipated experience.164 
The report further explains that "section 501 (c) is intended to 
afford to insurers and employers the same opportunities they 
would enjoy in the absence of this legislation to design and 
administer insurance products and benefit plans in a manner that 
is consistent with basic principles of insurance risk classification. "165 
Accordingly, the authors of section 501 (c) did not intend it to 
leave insurers unconstrained in their ability to establish 
disc1iminatory benefit exclusions and limitations. Rather, to avoid 
Breyer, supra note 159, at 848-61 (arguing that reliance upon legislative history is 
appropriate: for five distinct purposes: (1) to avoid absurd interpretive results; (2) to 
illuminate apparent drafting errors; (3) to elucidate specialized meanings that statutory 
words may have; (4) to identify the purpose of a law's terminology within the broader 
statutory context; and (5) to select the most appropriate of several reasonable 
interpretations of a politically controversial provision.). 
161 See Feldblum, supra note 70, at 143 n.105. 
162 ld. at 113. 
163 This addresses one of Justice. Scalia's primary concerns about legislative history, 
discussed supra note 157. 
164 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 85 (1989). 
165 I d. at 85-86. 
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violation of the ADA, insurers must utilize accepted actuarial 
principles or data concerning reasonable cost experience when 
setting their benefit terms. 
Finally, the Senate report explicitly states that the ADA's 
anti-discrimination mandate applies to insurance plans "regardless 
of the date an insurance plan or employer benefit plan was 
adopted. "166 The legislative history, therefore, does not support 
the view that the Betts decision is to apply to the ADA in order to 
preclude liability with respect to plans adopted before the statute's 
enactment. 
The two House of Representatives reports contain identical 
language. They provide that any exclusion, limitation, or rate 
differential in insurance plans must be "based on sound actuarial 
principles or . . . [be] related to actual or reasonably anticipated 
experience."167 They also state that the ADA governs insurance 
practices regardless of the date of the plan's adoption. 168 Because 
the legislative history is thoroughly consistent, was co-authored by 
all interested parties and not by just a single interest group,. and 
clearly explains ambiguous language, it is useful as a tool to 
interpret section 501 (c) and powerfully negates the conclusion of 
the circuit courts concerning the provision's meaning. 
E. Summary 
The circuit courts have construed the ADA too narrowly. 
The plain text of section 501( c), its legislative history, and 
administrative agency guidance all support the conclusion that the 
ADA governs the contents of insurance policies and requires 
insurance providers to justify their disability-based distinctions 
utilizing valid actuarial principles or cost-related experience. 
Nevertheless, the ADA provides only limited protection in 
the insurance realm to individuals with disabilities. First, the 
ADA applies only to disability-based distinctions and does not 
regulate discriminatory terms that affect medical conditions that 
are not disabilities or that affect a combination of disabilities and 
non-disabilities.169 This is a very significant exception because it 
166 !d. at 85. 
167 H.R REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 137 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 420; id. 
pt. 3, at 71, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 494. 
168 H.R REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 136 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 419; id. 
pt. 3, at 71, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 494. 
169 See Employee Benefits, supra note 72, at 627:0022. See also discussion supra Part 
I. B. 
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eliminates the possibility of successfully challenging many 
traditional insurance limitations such as those relating to ment:tl 
health care, eye care, and in-patient hospital days. Second, the 
ADA does not per se prohibit utilization of disability-based 
distinctions such as AIDS-caps. Rather, it allows employers to 
retain discriminatory insurance terms if they can prove a basis for 
them in sound actuarial principles, past cost experience, or 
evidence regarding reasonably anticipated benefit claims, so long 
as there is no evidence that the insurer intended to evade the 
purposes of the ADAY0 
Finally, employers can avoid all insurance challenges under 
Title I by not providing employees with health care benefits.171 In 
the alternative, employers can avoid accusations of discrimination 
by providing each employee with a set dollar amount to be used 
towards the purchase of health insurance. This approach is called 
"defined contribution," and is predicted by some to become 
increasingly popular in the near future. 172 The AD A may thus 
170 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 136-37 (1990). See also discussion supra Part 
I. B. 
171 See Richard Epstein, Rationing Access to Medical Care: Some Sober Second 
Thoughts, 1 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 81, 87 (1991) ("Once employers are told that if they 
choose to provide any medical care, they must provide a long list of benefits, it may well 
be that they will choose to provide no one any benefits at all."); see also Jeffrey G. 
Lenhart, ERISA Preemption: The Effect of Stop-Loss Insurance on Self-Insured Health 
Plans, 14 VA. TAX REv. 615, 618 (1995) (noting that "employers are not required to 
provide any health coverage to their workers."). 
172 Julie A Jacob, Consumer-Driven Health Plans Could Mean End of Capitation, AM. 
MED. "NEWS, Aug. 13, 2001, at 15, 18 ("Some sort of consumer-driven, defined-
contribution approach is coming."); Lisa Stammer, Healthcare from a New Perspective: 
Defined Contribution Plans Will Shift the Focus to Individual Choice and Competition, 
HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, May 2001, at 27. The Stammer article describes different 
models of defined contributions. Employers could choose to give employees an 
established dollar amount so that the employee can choose her preferred coverage 
package and pay any costs that exceed the base amount provided by the employer. 
Alternatively, employers might identify a variety of health plans and promise employees 
to pay a base amount directly to the health plan. Employees would be responsible for all 
costs that exceed that amount or would receive reimbursement if their chosen option costs 
less than the employer's pledged base amount. Finally, employers can choose to establish 
medical savings accounts for employees internally, with a financial institution, or with an 
HMO. See id. See also, Linda Havlin & Bill Maloney, Defining the New Health Care 
Benefit Models, EMPLOYEE BENEFJT PLAN REV., Jan. 2001, at 16-18; Paul Fronstin, 
Employee-Based Health Benefits: Trends and Outlook, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, May 2001, at 
20-22; Greg Scandlen, Everything (and more) You Ever Wanted to Know about Defined 
Contribution Health Plans, Pmt 11, HEALTH INS. UNDERWRITER, Jan. 2001, at 48, 54. The 
Scandlen article notes that defined contributions have several advantages for both 
employers and employees. Employers can avoid the burdens of choosing and managing 
health care plans, decrease administrative costs and perhaps increase employee morale by 
giving workers freedom to choose their own benefit programs. Employees can select from 
among all options available in the individual market and can customize their benefits 
according to their needs and preferences. See id. at 49-50. Other commentators, however, 
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create incentives for employers to stop serving as the direct 
providers of health insurance for the majority of working 
Americans.173 
II. TITLE VII AND OTHER ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
A. Title VII 
1. The Statutory Text 
Title VII provides, in relevant part, that covered employers 
may not "discriminate against any individual with respect to ... 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
migin."174 Title VII includes a 1978 amendment known as the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which prohibits discrimination 
based on "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical cmiditions" 
and requires that women affected by these conditions receive 
"benefits under fringe benefit programs" that are equivalent to 
those given to other employees. 175 
Unlike the ADA, Title VII applies only to employment 
discrimination.176 Thus, benefits that are provided by employers 
are regulated by the statute, but those purchased directly from an 
insurance company are not governed by Title VII. 177 The Supreme 
Court has stated that because Title VII's anti-discrimination 
mandate relates only to employment practices and does not 
directly govern the insurance industry, its application to employer-
provided health insurance benefits is not precluded by the 
note several disadvantages of defined contributions including (1) the fact that the 
individual market is more limited and less cost-effective than the group market, (2) that 
employees may choose to pocket the cash rather than use it to purchase health benefits 
and thus will join the population of the uninsured, and (3) that employers will lose the tax 
savings associated with providing insurance benefits to employees. See id. 
173 Approximately 65 percent of Americans under sixty-five receive health insurance 
benefits through employers. See Fronstin, supra note 172, at 4. 
174 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). A covered employer is defined as "a person 
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each 
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding 
calendar year." !d. § 2000e(b ). Several exemptions, however, are established in the 
provision. See id. 
175 !d. § 2000e(k). For the full text of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act see supra note 
12. 
176 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
177 See id. 
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McCarran-Ferguson Act.178 
Contemporary insurers have eliminated consideration of race, 
color, religion, and national origin in rate setting and risk 
classification.179 Sex-based classifications, however, remain a 
vigorously disputed practice.180 Some advocates argue that because 
sex is an immutable characteristic, gender-based categorization is 
no less deplorable than race-based classifications and should 
likewise be abandoned.181 Others contend that actuarial 
experience reveals cost differentials among males and females, and 
therefore premium rates and classifications should reflect these 
economic realities.182 
While insurers may include consideration of gender in their 
risk classification practices, employers, under Title VII, are not 
free to provide unequal benefits to male and female employees. 
Consequently, gender-based tables may not be used to establish 
the terms or premium prices of policies that are purchased by 
employers to effectuate their benefit plans, though they may be 
used for non-employer-provided policies. The application of Title 
VII to employer-provided benefits was analyzed by the Supreme 
Court in three seminal cases. 
The case of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. 
Manhart183 involved an employee group retirement plan that 
required women to make higher monthly contributions than men 
in order to receive equivalent monthly pension payments because, 
according to valid actuarial tables, women generally live longer 
than men.184 The Court held that the differential violated Title 
VII.185 It reasoned that Title VII prohibited discrimination against 
individuals and "precludes treatment of individuals as simply 
components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class. "186 
Thus, although women as a class live longer than men, any 
particular woman may have a shorter life than the average man's 
178 See Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1087 n.17 (1983) ("By its 
own terms, the McCarran-Ferguson Act applies only to the business of insurance and has 
no application to employment practices."). For a detailed discussion of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, see supra Part I.A. 
179 See Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to Be Left to the 
Actuaries, 2 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 349, 365 (1986); HARNEIT & LESNICK, supra note 6, 
§ 13.03[1]. 
180 See HARNEIT & LESNICK, supra note 6, § 13.05(6)( a). 
181 See id. 
182 See id. 
183 435 u.s. 702 (1978). 
184 See id. at 704-05. 
185 See id. at 717. 
186 Id. at 708. 
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and, consequently, female employees could not be forced to make 
higher monthly payments solely by virtue of their gender. 187 
A similar case, Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 188 
involved Arizona's voluntary pension plan under which all of the 
companies selected by the state to participate in the plan used sex-
based mortality tables and paid women lower monthly retirement 
benefits than they paid men who had made equivalent 
contributions.189 The Court noted that gender was the only 
consideration used to classify individuals of the same age without 
regard to other factors affecting longevity, such as smoking, 
alcohol use, and weight. 19° Citing its Manhart decision, the Court 
declared that the practice was unlawful under Title VIL 191 
Finally, in Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. 
EEOC, 192 the Supreme Court addressed a health insurance term 
that provided unequal maternity benefits for female employees 
and the spouses of male employees. 193 While female employees 
received hospitalization benefits for pregnancy-related conditions 
that were equivalent to hospitalization benefits for other medical 
conditions, the wives of male employees received less extensive 
coverage. 194 The Court found that the health insurance plan was 
unlawfully discriminatory because it gave "married male 
employees a benefit package for their dependents that . . . [was] 
less inclusive than the dependency coverage provided to married 
female employees." 195 
It follows from these Supreme Court cases that in order to 
prove a Title VII violation, a plaintiff must make a direct 
comparison between the benefits received by men and women and 
show that in some respect the insurance coverage available to one 
187 See id. 
188 463 U.S. 1073 (1983). 
189 See id. at 1077. Employees participating in the plan could postpone the receipt of a 
portion of their earnings until after retirement, thereby delaying the payment of federal 
income taxes on their wages. Arizona invited private companies to submit bids and 
describe the investment opportunities they would offer the state employees. It then 
selected several companies from among them to participate in the program. Employees 
subsequently chose one of the available companies and decided how much money they 
wished to defer each month. The state withheld the money from the employees' 
paychecks, channeled it to the designated companies, and administered the plan. See id. at 
1076-77. 
190 See id. at 1077. 
191 See id. at 1080-84. 
192 462 U.S. 669 (1983). 
193 See id. at 672-73. 
194 See id. 
195 Id. at 684 (referring specifically to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in reaching its 
conclusion). 
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gender is inferior to that available to the other sex. Jennifer 
Erickson was able to do just that when she challenged her plan's 
refusal to cover prescription contraceptives.196 Citing the Newport 
News decision, the court emphasized that "equality under Title 
VII is measured by evaluating the relative comprehensiveness of 
coverage offered to the sexes."197 Accordingly, the court found 
that a prescription plan's exclusion of reimbursement for 
medication that can be used only by women constitutes sex 
discrimination under Title Vll.198 It explained: "the exclusion of 
prescription contraceptives ... reduces the comprehensiveness of 
the coverage offered to female employees while leaving the 
coverage offered to male employees unchanged."199 
The analytical soundness of the Erickson decision, however, is 
open to criticism. The plaintiff did not make a direct comparison 
between prescription contraceptives, for which coverage was 
denied to women, and a comparable medication that was covered 
for men. In fact, there are no prescription contraceptives for men 
at the present time. Furthermore, at least arguably, the denial of 
coverage affects men and women equally, since the woman and 
her partner must choose an alternate fmm of birth control or 
perhaps pay for the pill out of pockeU00 The court's decision 
revolved around the somewhat tenuous argument that the 
employer's plan provided complete prescriptive drug coverage for 
men201 and incomplete coverage for women because it denied 
benefits for one medication that many women choose to utilize. It 
is not clear, however, that future courts will follow this precedent. 
By contrast to the Erickson case, in Kraul v. Iowa Methodist 
Medical Center,202 the court found that an employer-provided 
plan's exclusion of treatment for infertility did not violate Title 
VIJ.203 The court reasoned that when a couple is unable to have a 
196 See Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1276-77 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
197 ld. at 1271. 
198 See id. at 1271-72. 
199 /d. at 1275. 
200 See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding no 
violation of Title VII with respect to denial of coverage for infertility treatments because it 
affects men and women equally). While many women who seek oral contraceptives are 
unmarried and may be solely responsible for their birth control needs, some women 
seeking fertility treatments will also be unmarried and seeking to start families on their 
own for a variety of reasons. 
201 According to both parties, the court acknowledged that the prescription plan did not 
cover Viagra. However, the court stated only that this exclusion may also violate Title VII 
and left this determination to other courts that will be faced with the issue. See Erickson, 
141 F. Supp. 2d at 1275. 
2o2 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996). 
203 See id. at 681. 
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child, they are both affected by the infertility and must bear the 
cost of treatment, regardless of which one is infertile. It 
determined that the plaintiff had failed to present statistical 
evidence demonstrating that "female participants in IMMC's 
medical plan and their dependent spouses incurred a 
disproportionate amount of the cost of infertility treatments as 
compared with male Plan participants and their dependent 
spouses. "204 
It should be noted that plaintiff's claim was based on a 
disparate impact theory, alleging that the exclusion of 
reimbursement for procedures to treat infertility had a greater 
adverse effect for women than it did for men.205 Unlike the ADA, 
Title VII allows plaintiffs to make disparate impact claims relating 
to health insurance coverage.206 In order to overcome a disparate 
impact challenge, an employer must show that the insurance term 
in question is justified by a factor other than sex, such as business 
necessity207 or generally accepted medical criteria.208 
204 !d. See also Sales v. Franklin Covey Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(dismissing plaintiffs Title VII and PDA claims relating to her plan's exclusion of 
coverage for infertility treatments). 
205 See Krauel, 95 F.3d at 681. For an explanation of the disparate impact theory see 
supra Part I.B.3. 
206 See Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492, 1494 (9th Cir. 1983) (concluding 
that "disparate impact analysis is appropriate" in a Title VII case challenging an 
employer's "head of household" policy of allowing employees to obtain coverage for their 
spouses only if the employee earned more than half of the couple's combined wages). See 
also EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 252 (6th Cir. 1988) (using disparate impact 
analysis to challenge defendant's "head of household" rule); Employee Benefits, supra 
note 72, at 627:0026 (noting that EEOC guidelines allow for the use of the disparate 
impact theory in Title VII cases). 
In ADA cases, the use of the disparate impact theory is inappropriate because 
insurance terms that are facially neutral and affect both people with disabilities and people 
without disabilities are not disability-based distinctions and therefore are not covered by 
the ADA. See discussion supra Part I.B.4. ADA analysis is complicated by the threshold 
questions of whether the plaintiff is an individual with a disability and whether the 
challenged term is a disability-based distinction. By contrast, Title VII analysis is simpler. 
All individuals are entitled to statutory protection so long as they have suffered 
discrimination because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Consequently, 
insurance terms that are facially neutral and are applicable to both sexes, but impact one 
gender to a greater extent than the other, may violate the statute. 
207 See Wambheim, 705 F.2d at 1495 (finding the "head of household" rule justified by 
the employer's policy of keeping insurance costs as low as possible for all employees); J. C. 
Penney Co., 843 F.2d at 254 (holding that the "head of household" rule is justified because 
the defendant "wanted the biggest "bang for the buck" with its benefit package, and 
adopted this plan for that reason."). A head of household provision allows an employee 
to choose coverage for a spouse only if the employee earns more than the spouse. !d. at 
250. 
208 See Employee Benefits, supra note 72, at 627:0026-27 (depicting as an example, an 
employer that excludes coverage for "experimental treatments" and stating that such an 
employer may refuse to reimburse a breast cancer patient for a bone marrow transplant if 
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In Reger v. Espy,209 the plaintiff, like Ms. Kraul, failed in her 
attempt to challenge a plan provision utilizing the disparate impact 
theory. She alleged that her employer violated Title VII when its 
insurance plan excluded from coverage high dose chemotherapy 
and autologous bone marrow transplant ("HDC-ABMT") to treat 
breast cancer because the exclusion had a disparate impact on 
women.210 The court found that the plan refused to provide 
reimbursement for HDC-ABMT for most diagnoses, other than 
five specific cancers.211 The exclusion therefore affected both men 
and women, and the plaintiff failed to prove her disparate impact 
case.212 
2. Legislative History and EEOC Guidelines 
The prohibition against discrimination based on gender was 
added to Title VII on the last day of debates in the House of 
Representatives,213 and very little legislative history exists 
concerning the provision.214 The legislative history, therefore, is 
not enlightening with respect to the applicability of Title VII's 
original prohibition on sex disc1imination to health insurance 
benefits. 
More expansive legislative history exists concerning Title 
VII's 1978 amendment, the PDA. The record asserts, for example, 
that the PDA does not dictate that employers must provide 
hospital coverage for delivery.215 However, if an employer 
generally offers reimbursement for medical costs, it must provide 
it can prove that it used generally accepted medical criteria to conclude that the procedure 
is experimental). 
209 836 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ga. 1993). 
210 See id. at 870, 872. 
211 See id. at 872. 
212 See id Several international clinical trials that were completed a number of years 
after the decision was issued showed that HDC-ABMT is not effective in prolonging the 
life of breast cancer patients. See Patricia C. Kuszler, Financing Clinical Research and 
Experimental Therapies: Payment Due, But From Whom?, 3 DEPAULJ. HEALTH CAREL. 
441, 459-60 (2000). 
213 The gender classification was proposed by Representative Smith of Virginia, who 
voted against the Civil Rights Act. He apparently hoped to "clutter up" Title VII and 
increase general opposition to it so that it would not be passed. See 110 CONG. REc. 2577-
84 (1964); see also Bujel v. Borman Food Stores, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 141, 144 n.4 (E.D. 
Mich. 1974). 
2l4 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986); see also Marcelo L. 
Riffaud, Fetal Protection and UA W v. Johnson Controls, Inc.: Job Openings for Barren 
Women Only, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 843, 845 (1990). 
215 123 CONG. REC. 29,642 (1977). 
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reimbursement on the same basis for expenses related to 
pregnancy, delivery, and related conditions.216 The legislative 
history asserts that the law requires that "pregnant women be 
treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or 
inability to work."217 
The EEOC has issued guidance concerning the application of 
Title VII and the PDA to health insurance benefits.218 The EEOC 
guidelines explain that employers cannot provide different 
coverage to males and females if the underlying condition affects 
both men and women or if the treatment or diagnostic method is 
available for both genders.219 The guidelines emphasize that 
disparate impact analysis is available to Title VII plaintiffs and 
that employers must offer the same terms of coverage for 
treatment during pregnancy, delivery, and "related medical 
conditions" as for other treatments.220 
According to its statutory language, caselaw, legislative 
history, and administrative guidance, Title VII prohibits employer-
provided insurance plans from adopting coverage distinctions 
based on gender and pregnancy-related conditions. A plaintiff 
who cannot show a direct disparity will not be able to prove a 
statutory violation. Moreover, since Title VII applies only to 
employer-provided insurance plans, its effect on the insurance 
industry as a whole is limited. Finally, employers can avoid 
accusations of insurance discrimination under Title VII by offering 
employees no insurance benefits or by providing defined 
contributions and thus avoiding involvement with the specific 
terms of the employees' insurance policies.221 
B. The Equal Pay Act 
The Equal Pay Act ("EPA"Y!2 requires, in general terms, that 
employers pay equal wages to men and women for equal work223 
and applies to fringe benefits as a component of employees' 
compensation packages.224 EPA claims involve exclusively gender 
216 See id.; see also S. REP. No. 95-331 (1977). 
217 S. REP. No. 95-331 (1977). 
218 Employee Benefits, supra note 72, at 627:0025- 28. 
219 See id. at 627:0026. 
220 I d. at 627:0026-27. 
221 See discussion supra Part I.E. 
m 29 U.S. C. §§ 206-19 (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
223 !d. § 206. 
224 Employee Benefits, supra note 72, at 627:0025 n.87; EEOC v. Fremont Christian 
2002] DISCRIMINATION & HEALTH INSURANCE 1355 
discrimination and are most often brought together with Title VII 
claims.225 EPA plaintiffs must show a coverage disparity between 
the insurance benefits available to men and women in equivalent 
jobs, and therefore the analysis of EPA claims is very similar to the 
analysis of cases brought under Title VIJ.226 A large number of 
EPA cases, however, are dismissed because plaintiffs fail to prove 
that their work was in fact equivalent to that of the members of the 
opposite gender to which they are comparing themselves.227 
Furthermore, like Title VII, the EPA applies only to employer-
provided health insurance and not to the health insurance industry 
at large.Z28 Consequently, it is similarly limited in the extent to 
which it protects the American public against discrimination m 
health insurance. 
C. The Age Discrilnination in Employment Act 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")229 
prohibits employment discrimination based on age230 and protects 
individuals who are 40 years old or older.231 The ADEA is similar 
to Title VII in terms of language, structure, purpose, and 
analysis.232 The statute, however, does not require that employers 
School, 781 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9th Cir. 1986). 
225 See, e.g., Fremont Christian School, 781 F.2d at 1362; Warnbheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 
Inc., 705 F.2d 1492, 1493 (9th Cir. 1983); Willett v. Emory and Henry College, 427 F. Supp. 
631, 632 (W.D. Va. 1977); Taylor v. Franklin Drapery Co., 441 F. Supp. 279, 281 (W.D. 
Mo. 1977); Beavers v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 751 F. Supp. 956, 958 (N.D. Ala. 1990). 
226 See Employee Benefits, supra note 72, at 627:0025 n.87 (discussing Title VII and 
stating that "the same basic principles apply to charges of gender discrimination brought 
under the EPA"). 
227 See e.g., Wolf v. Northwest Indiana Symphony, 250 F.3d 1136 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(granting employer's motion for summary judgment in part because the plaintiff conceded 
that the female employees to whom he compared himself had different job duties than 
he); Beavers, 751 F. Supp. at 966 ("Mr. Beavers has not even attempted to point to a 
female who performed substantially equal work as did he"); Jensen v. Kellings Fine Foods, 
1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7221, at *23 (D. Kan. 1987) ("[P]Iaintiff has failed to meet her 
burden of showing that work she performed in the beauty aids and housewares 
department was substantially equal to that of the department heads"). 
I d. 
228 29 U.S. C. § 206 (1994 & Supp. 1998). 
229 Id. §§ 621-34. 
23o I d. § 623(a). The provision reads in relevant part: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age. 
231 Id. § 631(a). 
232 See HARNEIT & LESNICK, supra note 6, § 13.04[2][a]; Morelock v. NCR Corp., 546 
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offer older employees health insurance benefits that are equivalent 
to those available to younger workers. Rather, it mandates only 
that employers spend equal amounts of money or incur equal costs 
for insurance benefits provided to older and younger members of 
the workforce.233 This provision is based on the fact that the cost 
of health insurance benefits generally rises as an employee's age 
advances because people's health deteriorates as they grow 
older.234 The ADEA, therefore, does not comprehensively 
regulate the contents of health insurance plans and does not 
require that individuals in different age categories be offered 
benefits that are substantively equivalent. Furthermore, like Title 
VII and the EPA, it governs only employer-provided health 
insurance. The ADEA, consequently, provides older Americans 
with very limited protection against age discrimination in health 
msurance. 
D. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
In 1996, Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act ("HIP AA").235 HIP AA requires that all group 
F.2d 682, 686 (6th Cir. 1976), em. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979) ("The prohibitions of the 
ADEA are in terms virtually identical to those of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
except that 'age' has been substituted for 'race, color, religion, sex or national origin."') 
(internal citation omitted). However, some courts have held that disparate impact claims 
may not be brought under the ADEA. See, e.g., Adams v. Florida Power Corp. 255 F.3d 
1322, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001) (disallowing a disparate impact claim under the ADEA). The 
Eleventh Circuit noted that: "The Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits allow disparate 
impact claims under the AD EA. The First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth do not." I d. 
I d. 
233 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i). The provision reads in relevant part: 
(f) It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor 
organization ... 
(B) to observe the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan-
(i) where, for each benefit or benefit package, the actual amount of payment 
made or cost incurred on behalf of an older worker is no less than that made or 
incurred on behalf of a younger worker. 
It should also be noted that under Medicare law, an employer must offer its 
Medicare-eligible employees the same health benefits that it offers similarly situated 
employees under the age of 65. See 42 U.S. C.§ 1395y(b)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 2001). Thus, an 
employer may not take the availability of Medicare into account when establishing an 
employee's health benefits. See also Erie County Retirees Ass'n. v. County of Erie, Pa., 
220 F.3d 193, 197-98, 216 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that a defendant who offered Medicare-
eligible retirees health insurance benefits that were inferior to those provided to retirees 
who were not eligible for Medicare was not entitled to summary judgment unless the 
defendant could show that it could meet the equal benefit or equal cost standard). 
234 Employee Benefits, supra note 72, at 627:0006. 
235 42 U.S. C. §§ 300gg-300gg-92 (1994 & Supp. 2001). 
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health plans limit to no more than twelve months their period of 
excluded coverage for preexisting conditions; that is, conditions for 
which medical advice, diagnosis, care, or treatment was 
recommended or received in the prior six months.236 IllP AA's 
portability provisions guarantee that individuals covered by group 
insurance at one employer for eighteen continuous months will be 
granted access to any group policy offered by a new employer.237 
Furthermore, IDP AA requires insurers operating in the 
small-group market238 to guarantee issue of all the products they 
offer in the small-group market to all small groups, and, in any 
group, all eligible members of the group must be offered 
enrollment, regardless of their health status.239 In addition, a group 
health plan may not require any member of a group to pay a 
higher premium than other members of the group because of a 
healthstatus-related factor. 240 The statute requires all group 
carriers, in both large and small group markets, to guarantee 
renewal of their products.241 
IDP AA also reaches individual health insurance policies. It 
guarantees the portability of group insurance to individual 
insurance for certain individuals242 and requires that all individual 
policy coverage be guaranteed renewable.243 The statute does not 
restrict the amount of premium that an insurer may charge a 
236 /d. § 300gg(a). In the case of a late enrollee, the period of excluded coverage may 
be extended to 18 months. !d. In addition, group insurers must generally credit enrollees 
for any time during which they were previously excluded from coverage because of a 
preexisting condition exclusion that was applied to them by a previous insurer.- !d. §§ 
300gg(a), (c). 
237 !d. § 300gg-11. Tllis portability requirement is designed to alleviate the concerns of 
employees who were reluctant to leave current jobs for fear that they will be denied health 
insurance by future employers due to preexisting conditions. See Len M. Nichols & Linda 
1. Blumberg, A Different Kind of 'New Federalism'? The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996, 17 HEALTH AFFAIRS 25,27 (1998). 
238 A small-group market is defined as consisting of two to fifty employees. 42 U.S. C. § 
300gg-91(e)(4), (5). 
239 !d. § 300gg-11. More specifically, HIPAA provides that insurers offering group 
insurance may not base rules of eligibility for enrollment on any of the following factors: 
health status, physical or mental illness, claims experience, receipt of health care, medical 
history, genetic information, evidence of insurability, and disability. !d. § 300gg-1(a). 
240 !d. § 300gg-1(b). 
241 !d. § 300gg-12. 
242 !d. § 300gg-41. Individuals are eligible under the following conditions: 1) they have 
had eighteen months of continuous prior coverage with no coverage gap lasting longer 
than sixty-two days and have most recently had group coverage; 2) they have exhausted 
any COBRA benefits available to them and have no current access to group insurance or 
a public program; and 3) they are eligible for some type of guaranteed issue coverage in 
the individual market. !d. § 300gg-41(b). 
243 !d. § 300gg-42. 
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person purchasing an individual policy.244 The absence of 
regulation in this area is significant. A recent study found a vast 
range of annual premiums in the individual market extending from 
$408 to $30,000, with an average of $2,998 per year for healthy 
single people and $3,996 for those with medical problems.245 
IDP AA enhanced protection for health insurance 
beneficiaries by reducing health insurers' ability to select risks. 
However, it still allows them considerable discretion to engage in 
risk classification. Insurers may charge different groups different 
premiums in the group market, and individuals purchasing policies 
in the individual market may also be charged vastly different rates. 
In addition, the statute does not address limitations and exclusions 
of coverage for particular treatments. The statute, therefore, does 
not provide comprehensive protection to health insurance 
consumers and allows insurers to exercise discretion in many 
areas. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
Numerous federal anti-discrimination laws address the issue 
of health insurance coverage. One would therefore assume that 
they provide extensive and thorough protection against disability, 
gender, and age discrimination in insurance practices. This, 
however, is not the case. Several of the laws apply only to 
employer-provided insurance benefits. 246 Some create significant 
defenses for insurers, which allow them to justify disc1iminatory 
benefit terms.247 Thus, insurers can establish AIDS caps, can 
refuse to cover hearing aids, can often drastically limit or exclude 
coverage for mental health care,248 and can offer older employees 
far less insurance coverage than that available to younger workers. 
Moreover, none of the civil rights laws protect people on the basis 
of economic status, which is often the most significant determinant 
of the level of insurance obtainable by individuals. Consequently, 
we have in the United States 42.6 million uninsured people who 
244 Id. § 300gg-41(g)(1). 
245 See Geri Aston, Individual Market Tough for Many Insurance Buyers, AM. MED. 
NEWS, July 9, 2001, at 14. 
246 These laws include Title Vll, the EPA, and the AD EA. See discussion supra Part II. 
247 See, e.g., American with Disabilities Act§ SOl( c), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994); id § 
4(f), 29 U.S. C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i) (1994 & Supp. 1999). 
248 See discussion of Mental Health Parity Act, supra Part I.B.3. The Act expired on 
September 30, 2001. 42 U.S. C. § 300gg-S(f). 
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are not eligible for Medicaid or Medicare coverage.249 The federal 
statutory scheme that is designed to combat discrimination is 
fraught with large and troubling gaps in the arena of health 
insurance. 
Several approaches can be utilized to enhance protection for 
insurance beneficiaries. First, additional federal statutes could be 
passed to prohibit discriminatory insurance practices. Federal 
regulation that requires increasingly extensive coverage while 
leaving the private insurance system otherwise unchanged, 
however, could ultimately harm rather than help the American 
public. With additional coverage requirements, insurance 
companies would likely continue to raise premiums in order to 
maintain profitability, malcing insurance unaffordable for many 
individuals. Furthermore, ever-increasing insurance costs could 
induce employers to stop providing health insurance to their 
employees, because employers are not required by law to provide 
insurance benefits.250 
Federal law is also often ambiguous with respect to its 
applicability to health insurance. The statutes have generated 
considerable litigation, which is costly for plaintiffs, defendants, 
and taxpayers.251 Inconsistent decisions issued by different courts 
also may cause confusion for insurers seeking judicial guidance 
concerning insurance terms. Federal anti-discrimination laws are 
the product of extensive lobbying and political compromise. 
Consequently, they often contain equivocal and imprecise 
language, which is open to varying interpretations.252 
Finally, because legislation is often a response to public 
pressure and political concern, it does not necessarily assist all 
those in need.253 Groups with strong lobbyists or prominent 
249 See Aston, supra, note 245, at 14; see also Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank C. Ullman, 
Health Insurance and Health Access, 22 J. LEG. MED. 247, 247 (2001). Other estimates 
range from 42.1 million uninsured (in 1999) to 44 million uninsured (in 2000). See Steven 
A. Schroeder, Prospects for Expanding Health Insurance Coverage, 344 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 847, 847 (2001); see also Stephen Blakely, The Economic Costs of the Uninsured, 
EBRI NOTES, Aug. 2000, at 1. Over 80% of the uninsured are from families in which at 
least one member is employed, and almost two thirds are under the age of 35. More than 
half are in families whose incomes fall below 200% of the federal poverty level, that is, less 
than $34,100 for a family of four. See Schroeder, supra, at 847. 
250 See Lenhart, supra note 171, at 618 ("[E]mployers are not required to provide any 
health coverage to their workers"); see also Blakely, supra note 249, at 1 ("Employers are 
not legally required to provide coverage to their workers, and individuals are not legally 
required to maintain coverage"). 
251 See cases discussed supra Parts I-II. 
252 See SCALIA, supra note 92, at 34 (discussing the involvement of lobbyists in 
Congressional floor debates). 
253 See id. 
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representatives might succeed in promulgating legislation that 
benefits their special interest, while equally deserving groups may 
fail because of much weaker lobbying abilities and less 
prominence. 254 
In the alternative, additional regulation of health insurance 
coverage could be left to the states. Many states have in fact tried 
to address specific problems of discrimination by mandating 
coverage for particular treatments. Almost 1000 different state 
mandates concerning health insurance coverage have been issued 
by state legislatures.255 State mandates, however, also provide only 
a very partial solution. 
First, state mandates will not protect patients enrolled in self-
funded employee benefit plans256 because under a federal law 
called the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
("ERISA"),257 state laws regulating insurance are preempted with 
respect to self-funded plans and cannot be enforced.258 This 
exception is quite consequential because a growing number of 
employers are self-insured.ZS9 In addition, state legislation, like 
federal legislation, can lead to the problems of rising insurance 
254 In 1998, for example, Congress enacted the Women's Health and Cancer Rights Act 
of 1998. 29 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (Supp. 2001). The Act requires all group health plans and 
health insurance issuers offering coverage for mastectomies to provide reimbursement for 
reconstructive surgery that is associated with a mastectomy. Patients suffering from other 
cancers, however, have not achieved the passage of legislation that addresses their specific 
coverage issues. See id. 
255 See United States General Accounting Office Report to the Honorable James M. 
Jeffords, U.S. Senate, Health Insurance Regulation: Varying State Requirements Affect 
Cost of Insurance GAO?HEHS-96-161 (1996), at 9 (noting that "(o]n average, states have 
enacted laws mandating about 18 specific benefits"); New Study Shows 992 Mandated 
Benefits in the States, MEo. BENEFITS, Sept. 30, 1991, at 6; Russell Korobkin, The 
Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection" Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded 
Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 2 (1999) (citing Alain C. 
Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Markets and Collective Action in Regulating Managed Care, 
HEALTH AFF. Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 26, 30). 
256 Employers who choose self-funded plans pay their employees' medical claims on 
their own rather than contracting with a commercial insurer that collects premiums and 
serves as a third party payer. Every medical claim translates into an out-of-pocket 
expense for these employers. They are therefore known as self-insured employers. See 
Mark A. Rothstein, The Law of Medical and Genetic Privacy in the Workplace, in 
GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECfiNG PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC 
ERA 281, 293 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997). 
257 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-461. 
258 See Sharona Hoffman, A Proposal for Federal Legislation to Address Health 
Insurance Coverage for Experimental and Investigational Treatments, 78 OR. L. REv. 203, 
41-243 (1999); see also FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) ("We read the ... 
(statute] to exempt self-funded ERISA plans from state laws that 'regulat[e] insurance."'). 
259 See Rothstein, supra note 256, at 293. In 1993, 93 percent of employers with more 
than 40,000 employees were self-insured, as were 85 percent of employers with 5,000-
40,000 employees, and 37 percent of those with 50-199 employees. See id. 
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costs, litigation due to ambiguous drafting, and piecemeal 
responses to lobbying from powerful interest groups or to high 
fil 260 pro e cases. 
A third approach is governmental intervention in the form of 
a centralized, publicly accountable agency that would establish an 
extensive, nationally binding health care coverage mandate. Many 
other industries are already regulated by powerful administrative 
agencies. For example, the Federal Aviation Administration 
("FAA") regulates the aviation industry,261 the Environmental 
Protection Agency ("EPA") regulates activities that affect the 
environment,Z62 and the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") 
regulates food and drug products.263 There is no reason why the 
health insurance industry should not be subject to similar 
governmental oversight. 
Construction of a detailed model for such an agency is beyond 
the scope of this paper.264 However, it is important to emphasize 
that the regulatory entity should make its decisions in light of 
current scientific research, medical outcome data, and patient 
preferences, with input from patients, physicians, researchers, 
research sponsors, and insurers. Moreover, it should focus on the 
global cost of the coverage requirements it designs in order to 
create a benefits package that is responsive to both patient needs 
and the reality of finite economic resources. 
260 The point is illustrated clearly by an Assembly Insurance Committee 
Statement regarding a New Jersey law that mandates reimbursement for the 
treatment of Wilm's tumor by high dose chemotherapy and an autologous 
bone marrow transplant. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6f note (West 1996) 
(Assembly Insurance Committee Statement). It states in relevant part: 
This bill has been referred to as the "Tishna Rollo Bill." Tishna Rollo is an 
eight-year-old Glen Ridge girl who is battling Wilm's tumor, a rare form of 
cancer which generally affects the kidneys before spreading to other parts of 
the body. Recently, Tishna's case has received much attention because her 
doctors have concluded that the transplants are the one chance they have to 
cure her disease, yet her family's health insurer initially refused to provide 
coverage for the treatment because it asserted that such treatment was not 
covered in her health insurance contract as it is considered "experimental" 
or "investigational." Court action on this issue is pending. This bill will 
eliminate the controversy surrounding the treatment and, in effect, absolve 
health insurers, and ultimately the courts, of the responsibility of making any 
determination regarding this issue. Id. 
261 See 49 U.S. C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. 1997). 
262 See 42 U.S. C. § 4321 (1994) (Reorganization plans, Section 1). 
263 See 21 U.S. C. § 393 (1994 & Supp. 1999). 
264 For further discussion see Sharona Hoffman, Unmanaged Care: Towards Moral 
Faimess in Health Care Coverage (submitted for publication in the spring of 2002). 
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Additional piecemeal federal and state legislation will not 
effectively solve the problem of discrimination in health insurance 
coverage. Without a national benefits package, we will continue to 
have hearing impaired individuals who cannot afford hearing aids 
and people with AIDS who cannot obtain needed treatment. It is 
only with oversight and regulation by a centralized, publicly 
accountable governmental agency that we can begin to tackle the 
challenge of enhancing protection for health insurance 
beneficiaries. 
